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Lawyer: HIV and Dentistry

Notes
HiV AND DENTISTRY*
I. INTRODUCTION
"I blame.. every single one of you bastards."' Twenty-three-year-old
Kimberly Bergalis did not hesitate when she blamed her HIV infection not only
on the dentist who infected her, but also on the government for failing to
prevent it.' As her young life dwindled during the summer of 1991, the horror
* This note is written in honor of my father, the late Dr. Harrison Lawyer, D.D.S., whose
concern for the issues facing dentistry today inspired my research, and whose 40 years of leadership
and commitment to the field showed me the true meaning of being a professional.
1. 137 CONO. REc. H5204 (daily ed. June 26, 1991) (quoting an article by David Zeman of
the Miami Herald). The story of Kimberly Bergalis captured the attention of the nation because it
realized many people's worst fears: an individual can be monogamous, heterosexual, and not use
intravenous drugs, yet still contract and die from HIV. Indeed, an individual can be infected by the
very doctor from whom she seeks medical care.
2. Ms. Bergalis contracted the disease while undergoing the extraction of two molars. See
Barbara Kantrowitz et al., Doctors and AIDS, NEWSWEEK, July 1, 1991, at 49. Her dentist, Dr.
David Acer, was infected with the HIV virus. Bruce Lambert, limberly Bergalis is Dead at 23;
Symbol ofDebate over AIDS Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1991, at D9. It has not been determined
how Ms. Bergalis became infected during the extraction procedure. Id. There is some speculation
that the dentist intentionally infected her. Id. It has not been determined whether Dr. Acer was
conforming with the Centers for Disease Control's (CDC) recommended protective measures of
properly disinfecting and not reusing medical equipment such as surgical gloves. Id. It is also
unclear whether the infection was even transmitted from Dr. Acer or whether Ms. Bergalis
contracted the virus from another of Dr. Acer's patients via poorly sterilized dental instruments.
Richard Saltus, Doctors Troubled by AIDS-Test Cry, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 4, 1991, at 1, 19
(reporting that the CDC was investigating the possibility that the virus was spread from an infected
patient to other patients via improperly sterilized dental equipment).
Subsequent investigations by the CDC indicate that five other patients of Dr. Acer were also
infected during treatment by the dentist. Centers for Disease Control, Recommendations for
Preventing Transmission of HIV and Hepatitis B to Patients During Exposure Prone Invasive
Procedures, 40 MORBIDrry & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 3 (1991). Investigators have established
that none of the patients had any risk factors for AIDS other than dental treatment by Dr. Acer. Id.
Sophisticated genetic sequencing tests have documented that all of the infected patients share the
same viral strain as Dr. Acer. Id.
Dr. Harold Jaffe, M.D., has been deluged in the extraordinary controversy over how the
patients were infected. As Deputy Director for AIDS Science for the federal CDC, Jaffe stated that
he believes the patients contracted the disease from Dr. Acer, but is not sure how the transmission
occurred. Dennis L. Breo, The Dental AIDS Cases-Murder or an Unsolvable Mystery?, 270
JAMA 2732 (1993). Jaffe further stated:
Acer was known to have oral Kaposi's sarcoma and he might have used his dental
instruments to treat himself and then reused them on patients without proper
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of Kimberly Bergalis' tragedy moved the nation and concentrated its attention
on the transmission of HIV during medical and dental treatments and the
apparent failure of policymakers to minimize the risk of future incidents.3
The inability of the American society as a whole to respond promptly and
effectively to the HIV crisis stems largely from the struggle to balance the
individual privacy rights of HIV carriers with the public health concerns of the
state.4 In one respect, carriers have a strong interest in not disclosing their
condition to avoid discrimination and harassment by employers, health care

sterilization. However, no one in Acer's office ever saw him treat himself in this
manner.
Or, he might have injured himself while his fingers were inside the patient's
mouth, possibly while palpating the tip of the anesthetic needle, and his blood spilled
directly into the patient's mouth. Although there is no documented neuropathy in Acer's
medical records, his AIDS might have made his sense of touch less than normal. If so,
he might have put his finger and the anesthetic needle into the patient's mouth at the
same time, stuck himself, and spilled infectious blood into the patient's mouth.
Or, he might have committed murder through a variety of ways. He might have
kept a syringe in his pocket, filled with a mixture of anesthetic and his own blood, and
used this to infect the patient. I don't pretend to understand all the possibilities by
which he might have intentionally infected patients. However, all six patients were fully
awake during their procedures and neither they nor anyone on Acer's staff ever noticed
anything unusual ....
It could [happen again] . . . . The fact is that the current CDC guidelines for

evaluation of HIV-infected health workers are voluntary and we have no way of
enforcing them. And dentists and surgeons do stick themselves with needles and under
current technology this risk cannot be reduced to zero. So, another case could happen.
And, if we do get another documented case of HIV transmission from health worker to
patient, there will be a tremendous public demand for mandatory testing of health
workers.
Id. at 2732, 2734 (emphasis in original). The CDC spent more than $1 million and dedicated two
dozen investigators to try to determine what happened in Acer's dental practice. Id. at 2732.
However, Jaffe believes that the ambivalence of the dental and medical associations about the case
caused them to lose credibility with their patients. Id. at 2734. Douglas Feldman, a medical
anthropologist in the department of psychiatry at the University of Miami (Fla.) School of Medicine,
maintains that contact tracing should be done on Dr. Acer's 1400 patients who have not been tested
for HIV because he believes another five or six cases of the transfer of HIV would be discovered.
Id. at 2733.
3. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. H5204-05 (daily ed. June 26, 1991) (statement of Congressman
Burton) (proposing legislation requiring mandatory HIV testing of health care providers and
disclosure to patients).
4. See generally Ugo Colella, Balancing Confideniality and Liberal Discovery: A Unified
Approach to Discovery Disputes over HiVl Information, J. HEALTH & HOSP. L., Nov. 1993, at 32835.
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providers, friends, and insurance companies.' In the other respect, the state has
a strong interest in requiring that HIV carriers disclose this information to aid
research efforts and to prevent further transmission of the virus.6 The
competition between these conflicting interests has delayed the process of
effectively attacking the epidemic through comprehensive legislation, education,
science, and medicine. 7
This Note will analyze the competing privacy and public health interests as
they relate to health care, and specifically as they relate to dentistry. Although
many studies and legislative efforts have focused on the handling of HIV in the
health care industry," few have addressed the concerns and problems that are
unique to dentistry. 9 Dentists and patients are without direction as to their legal

5. Because people are afraid of contracting the disease, they often avoid associating on any level
with HIV carriers. Many carriers are fired or denied employment because of this fear. Most
carriers are denied health insurance coverage once their conditions are diagnosed and are
subsequently left with devastating debts from the medical bills. Insurance companies have employed
a number of methods to deny health and life insurance coverage to individuals with HIV. For a
detailed discussion, see Mark Scherzer, Insurance, in AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR THE
PUBLIC 185, 189-200 (Harlon L. Dalton et al. eds., 1987). Some action is being taken by the
government to remedy the insurance disaster. For a discussion, see Laura Pincus, The Americans
with DisabilitiesAct: Employers' New Responsibilities to HIV-Positive Employees, 21 HoFSTRA L.
REV. 561 (1993); Brian McCormick, HIV InsuranceRestrictionsHit in ADA Cases, AM. MEDICAL
NEWS, Jan. 24, 1994, at 6. See also Company Ertends OccupationalHIV Coverage to all its
Employees, AIDS WKLY., Jan. 31, 1994, at 15.
6. See generally Scott Burris, Rationality Review and the Politics of Public Health, 34 VILL.
L. REV. 933 (1989).
7. See supra text accompanying note 4; infra notes 249-91 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Ind. Pub. L. No. 123-1988 (codified in scattered sections of IND. CODE § 16-41
(1993)); Jane H. Barney, A Health Care Worker's Duty to Undergo Routine Testing for HIV/AIDS
and to Disclose Positive Results to Patients, 52 A. L. REV. 933 (1992); Gary I. Strausborg &
Randal D. Getz, Health Care Workers with AIDS: Duties, Rights, and Potential Tor Liability, 21
U. BALT. L. REV. 285 (1992); Troyen A. Brennsn, Transmissionof the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus in the Health Care Setting-7ime For Action, 324 NEw ENO. J. MED. 1504 (1991); Sev S.
Fluss & Dineke Zeegers, AIDS, HIV and Health Care Workers: Some InternationalLegislative
Perspectives, 48 MD. L. REV. 77 (1989); Larry Gostin, Hospitals, Health Care Professionals,and
AIDS: 7he 'Right to Know" the Health Status of Professionalsand Patients, 48 MD. L. Rv. 12
(1989); Michael Kirby, AIDS and Law, 118 DAEDALUS 101 (1989); Eugene McCry & the
Cooperative Needlestick Surveillance Group, OccupationalRisk of the Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome Among Health Care Workers, 314 NEW ENO. J. MED. 1127 (1986).
9. Dentistry is one area of health care where both the provider and the patient are at particular
risk of exposure to the virus because of the presence of blood and tissue during invasive procedures
such as extractions, root canal preparations, and periodontal treatments. Hypodermic needles are
used for administering local anesthetics, and sharp or abrasive instruments are used during dental
procedures. Many opportunities exist for accidental percutaneous injuries to the hands, even with
glove use. Patients tend to flinch under pain, causing instruments to slip accidentally. When this
happens, both the dentist and patient are at risk because an exchange of blood can result. See
generallyRobert S. Klein et al., Low OccupationalRisk ofHuman Immunodeficiency Virus Infection
Among Dental Professionals, 318 NEW ENO. J. MED. 86 (1988).
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duties and rights, and they are looking to state courts for help in resolving cases
of HIV transmission in dental settings.' Without proper input from the public,
the dental associations, and the legislature, these ill-equipped courts are left to

define the emotionally charged and politically sensitive duties of dentists and
patients who may have to disclose their conditions to one another.II The result
is an inconsistent, piece-meal reaction to this serious problem. As more cases
of HIV transmission in dental settings are reported and litigated, it will become

more clear that there is an urgent need to evaluate the special circumstances and
In most cases, oral lesions are the first manifestations of AIDS. Charles E. Barr, Dental
Management of HIV-Associated Oral Mucosal Lesions: Current and Experimental Techniques, in
PERSPBCTIVES ON ORAL MANIFBSTATIONS OF AIDS 77-95 (Paul B. Robertson & John S. Greenspan
eds., 1988). The time between initial infection with HIV and the appearance of these lesions is
unknown. Id. Identification, diagnosis, and treatment or oral lesions may be facilitated by
consultation with an appropriate specialist. Id. Knowledge of the extent of the patient's
immunodeficiency is crucial for its proper management. Id. Furthermore, there is a significant risk
of harmful drug interaction if dentists prescribe medication without knowledge of the other
medication patients might be taking. Id.
Oral lesions recognized to be associated with HIV infection are: candidiasis, histoplasmosis,
geotrichosis, cryptococcoses, herpes simplex, herpes zoster, hairy leukoplakia, warts, kaposi's
sarcoma, non-hodgkin's lymphoma, HIV gingivitis, HIV periodontitis, necrotizing stomatitis,
mycobacterium avium intracelluare, recurrent aphthous ulcers, xerostomia, salivary gland
enlargement, and idiopathic thrombocytopenic purpura. AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION, FACTS
ABOUT AIDS FOR THE DENTAL TEAM 4-5 (3d ed. 1991). Oral candidiasis is perhaps the most
common lesion associated with HIV. Aaron Glatt, 7herapyfor OropharyngealCandidiasis in HIVInfected Patients, 46 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNODEFICIENCY SYNDROMES 1317 (1993). Candidiasis is
a fungal infection in the mouth characterized by creamy, white lesions with raw, bleeding surfaces
underneath. Id. The infection can be effectively treated with Fluconazole or Clotrimazole when
properly diagnosed. Id. Herpes simplex virus (HSV) infection in patients with immune disorders
may appear as narrow, linear cracks on the tongue surface. Marc E. Grossman et al., Brief Report:
Herpetc Geometric Glossids, 329 NEw ENO. J. MED. 1859 (1993). The cracks have a geometric
pattern that runs the length of the tongue and are crossed or branched. Id. HSV affects the tongue,
the floor of the mouth, the soft palate, and the mucous membranes of the cheek. Id.
10. See generally Satler v. New York Commission on Human Rights, 580 N.Y.2d 35 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1992); Neuberger v. Olson, No. 12013, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 58 (Del. Ch. Mar. 11,
1992); McBarnette v. Feldman, 582 N.Y.S.2d 900 (N.Y. 1992).
11. For example, a Syracuse doctor was found liable for revealing a patient's HIV status in
response to a subpoena for medical records filed by the Pennsylvania Workers Compensation Board.
.Doe v. Roe, 588 N.Y.S.2d 236 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992). In his holding, Justice Reagan addressed
a question that had not been presented squarely to a court before and concluded that an HIV-infected
person has a legal duty to disclose that fact to a health care provider before undergoing any bodily
infusive physical examination.
Such a legal duty arises out of not only moral and ethical considerations, but out of
logic, common sense and medical evidence as well, with regard to the general health of
society and its physician caretakers. To hold otherwise would be to improvidently
elevate policy and the political aspects of this fatal disease over the medically proven
health dangers of exposure to HIV infected blood, semen, saliva, etc., and to
demonstrated risks of transmission to unknowing and unprepared recipients.
Id. at 239. Justice Reagan stated that this duty comes not only from moral and ethical
considerations, but also from medical concerns. Id.
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risks in the dental community" and to develop an aggressive, comprehensive
approach to deal with this dilemma through a combination of legislation and
dental association policies. 3
Section H of this Note will survey the medical and scientific epidemiology
of HIV to provide a basic understanding of the modes of transmission and the
risk this virus poses to our society today. 14 Section III of the Note will
examine the current status of laws and dental association policies concerning
HIV and dentistry to show what has been done thus far to balance the privacy
and public health interests and to curb transmission." This Section will
suggest areas where these authorities are deficient in coping effectively with the
problem because they are too vague, lack proper enforcement, and work
independently of each other. It will conclude that the legislature, the dental
association, and the public must be willing to work together for a solution that
protects everyone. Section IV will briefly discuss the development of the
constitutional right of privacy and how that right plays a significant role in the
health care industry and in approaching the HIV crisis. 6 Sections V and VI
will examine the competing interests in public health and the development of the
power of the state to act for the protection of the public's safety and welfare
during an epidemic."7 In attempting to reach a plausible balance between these
competing interests in the context of dentistry, Section VII will suggest a course
of action' by proposing a statute and potential dental association policies as
part of a comprehensive approach to minimize the risk of HIV transmission. 9
These recommendations are meant to serve as a framework to guide dentists,
patients, and courts in dealing with HIV.
II. EPIDEMIOLOGY OF HIV AND AIDS

The first American cases of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
(AIDS),' a disease caused by HIV, were reported in Los Angeles in 1981.21

12. See supra note 9.
13. See infra notes 292-96 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 20-47 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 48-85 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 86-198 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 199-291 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 292-96 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 292-96 and accompanying text. See also text following note 296.
20. AIDS is caused by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) which weakens the body by
destroying white blood cells needed to attack and kill bacteria and other infectious material in the
body. Alexandra M. Levine, Technical Article: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: The Facu,
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 423 (1991).
HIV infection is a continuum with full-blown AIDS as the final stage of infection. Id. at 427.
HIV may cause a completely asymptomatic state of infection in which the individual is well in all
respects, has no symptom or sign of illness, and yet has the live HIV virus growing in the blood and
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Since that time, the academic, medical, scientific, and legal sectors, as well as
the community at large, have never been the same. Despite increasing public

health and educational efforts,' more than thirty million people worldwideP
iscapable of transmitting the virus to others. Id. at 429. This is perhaps the most dangerous stage
for the public health because carriers may not take extra precautions since most do not know they
have the virus. The virus is also known to cause AIDS-related complex (ARC) which occurs when
an infected person exhibits effects of immunodeficiency, such as fever, weight loss, night sweats,
or diarrhea but does not yet have any opportunistic diseases. Id. Full-blown AIDS is diagnosed
when an individual is found to have one or more of the following illnesses: (1) opportunistic
infection (2) Kaposi's sarcoma (3) high-grade, B-cell lymphoma (4) AIDS-dementia/encephalopathy
syndrome (5) wasting syndrome (slim disease). Id. at 424.
First, an opportunistic infection is a severe or life-threatening infection caused by an organism
that normally lives with humans, to the advantage of both, and normally does not cause disease due
to the presence of an intact immune, or defense system in normal individuals. Id. The second
illness by which an individual may be diagnosed with AIDS is a type of cancer of the blood vessel
wall, termed Kaposi's sarcoma. Id. at 425. The third criterion for diagnosis of AIDS is the
development of certain types of malignant lymphoma, termed "high-grade B-cell," "Burkitt's," or
"immunoblastic" lymphoma. Id. The fourth criterion for a diagnosis of AIDS is the so-called
"wasting syndrome" characterized by weight loss, with or without fevers, night sweats, and general
debility. Centers for Disease Control, Revision of the CDC Surveillance Case Definition for
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 36 MORBIDIrrY & MORTALITY WKL.y. Ra. IS, 3S-15S
(1987). The illness had been previously described in Africa, where it was known as "slim disease,"
because of the gradual wasting of affected individuals. E. Serwadda et al., Slim Disease: A New
Disease in Ugandaand Its Association with H7L V-ll Infection, 2 LANCLr 849 (1985). The average
duration of the latent period from initial infection to the development of full-blown AIDS is
approximately seven to ten years. James J. Goedert etal., Three-Year Incidence ofAIDS in Five
Cohorts of HTLV-Ill-Infected Risk Group Members, 231 SCIENCE 992 (1986).
21. Centers for Disease Control, Pneumocystis Pneumonia-Los Angeles, 30 MORBIDrITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. Ri. 250 (1981).

22. For a discussion on the power of the media over what is socially accepted by society, see
Jonathan Alter, The Power to Change What's "Cool," NEWSWEEK, Jan. 17, 1994, at 23.
President Clinton increased funding for AIDS research to $1.3 billion in the 1994 fiscal year,
plus a 66% increase in funding for community-based treatment and services. Advocates commend
the President's determination to push legislation in treating and preventing AIDS and related
diseases. See Will Attention Bring Action?, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 17, 1994, at 1. However, no
cure or vaccine is expected in the near future. Id. Clinton backed a plan to increase funding of the
Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resource Emergency Act by 22% for 1993. See Laurie Jones,
More Research, More Treatment-Still More To Be Done, Am.MED. NEWS, Feb. 7, 1994, at 3.
In addition, Clinton authorized a reorganization of the National Institutes of Health Office of AIDS.
Id. This may signal a move away from clinical research and toward a basic scientific approach to
studying the virus. Id. Perhaps the main accomplishment of the administration in regard to AIDS
has been an advertising campaign aimed at young people developed by the CDC. See Laurie Jones,
PreventionSeen as Best AIDS Hope, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 24, 1994, at 3. Overall, the consensus
is that effective prevention should center on explicit, community-based programs targeting high-risk
populations. Id.
23. HIV is rapidly becoming a grave concern for most of the world. For example, HIV
infection in the continent of Africa rose by 1.5 million in 1993, according to Dr. Michael Merson
of the World Health Organization's Global Program on AIDS. Infections Climb to Two-Thirds of
World Total, Conferees Told, AIDS WKLY., Dec. 20, 1993, at 8. The number raises the estimated
total of African HIV infections to around 10 million, two-thirds of the world total of 15 million.
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could be infected with HIV by the year 2000.' To date, the pharmaceutical
industry is not close to refining and marketing a cure or vaccine for this
virus.' In fact, some smaller researchers have begun to curb research and
development efforts because the enormous financial investments necessary to
support the research seem to be yielding few results. 2'
HIV is transmitted primarily by direct blood-to-blood contact or by
exchange of other bodily fluids with an infected individual.' Except through

Id. Most experts agree that traditions such as men inheriting widows of deceased male relatives are
spreading the disease. Kenya Cstom Boosts AIDS Epidemic, Officials Say, JET, Jan. 10, 1994, at
40; R.M. Anderson et al., The Spread of HIV-1 in Africa: Sexual Contact Patterns and the
PredictedDemographicImpactofAIDS, 352 NATURE 581-89 (1991). In Canada, the death toll from
AIDS reached 1078 in 1992. AIDS DeathsReached 1078 in 1992, FACTs ON FILE, Nov. 18, 1993,
at 868. In Haiti, sixty percent of urban hospital beds are occupied by HIV patients. J. Pape &
W.D. Johnson, AIDS in Haiti, AIDS WKLY., Dec. 20, 1993, at 23.
24. Christine Gorman, InvincibleAIDS, TIME, Aug. 3, 1992, at 30. A new study found that
AIDS is now the leading killer of American men between the ages of 25 and 44. AIDS News Brief,
FAcTs ON FILE, Dec. 9, 1993, at 918. Sadly, only two percent of men believe that they have a
medium or high chance of contracting AIDS. Linda Wasmer Smith, The Numbers Racket: What
are the Odds You Should Let Health Statistics Rule Your Life?, JOE WELDER'S MEN'S FITNESS, Feb.
1994, at 74. Because many more people have contracted HIV in recent years, the number of deaths
resulting from AIDS is expected to increase dramatically. See Will Attention Bring Action?, supra
note 22, at 1. Analysis of figures on the AIDS epidemic indicates that deaths will exceed 320,000
by September of 1994, compared to 204,390 in 1993, and 25,000 in 1990. J. Michael McGinnis
& William H. Foege, Actual Causes of Death in the United States, 270 JAMA 2207 (1993).
25. The AIDS drugs Maitec and ABLC are entering latter-stage testing by Liposome Company,
Inc., but problems are expected. AIDS Drugs to Enter Latter-Stage Testing, AIDS WKLY., Jan. 24,
1994, at 8. Most of the efforts are directed toward relieving the painful symptoms of AIDS instead
of developing a cure. Marinol (dronabinol), a prescription drug containing a synthetic form of one
of marijuana's active ingredients (delta- 9- tetrahydrocannbinol), was approved in 1992 to prevent
weight loss in AIDS patients. See "Pot," "Crack," IncreasesPneumonia in AIDS Patients, FDA
CONSUMER, Dec. 1993, at 3; Wayne Hearn, BurningIssue: Should PatientsGo to Pot?, AM. MED.
NEwS, Feb. 7, 1994, at 14.
26. Eli Lilly & Co. recently reduced AIDS research by a significant margin. Ei Lilly & Co.
Cutting AIDS Research, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 17, 1994, at D2. Furthermore, the Pentagon recently
canceled a plan to test a vaccine called VaxSyn. John Schwartz, PentagonDrops Plan to Test an
AIDS Vaccine, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1994, at A3.
27. Joseph A. Kovacs & Henry Masur, Opportunistic Infections, in AIDS: ETIOLOGY,
DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT AND PREVENTION 199-225 (Vincent T. DeVita, Jr., et al. eds., 2d ed.

1988). Some concentration of the virus is found in every bodily fluid of those who are infected,
including saliva, tears, sweat, and semen. However, only semen, vaginal secretions, blood, and
breast milk are implicated in the transmission of HIV because the concentration of the virus in
saliva, sweat, and tears is too low to make transmission probable. Centers for Disease Control,
Recommendationsfor Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care Settings, 36 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 35 (Supp. No. 2S 1987); HIV Antibody Detection in Oral Fluids, 71
BULLETIN OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 641 (1993).

While there is no conclusive

scientific determination, "[slaliva does not seem to be an effective route of transmission, probably
because of the low titers found and the co-existence of anti-body." Nancy Mueller, The
Epidemiology of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, 14 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE
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sexual contact or use of an infected intravenous needle, the most probable means
of transmission is through the exchange of bodily fluids between a patient and
a health care worker when one of them is HIV-positive. While the risk of
contracting HIV in a health care setting is very low," infections allegedly
related to occupational risk have surfaced in the last few years." Treatment
. procedures where blood and mucous membranes are frequently present create
a higher risk of exposure to the virus for health care providers and patients than
do procedures where bodily fluids are not present.3 The risk of exposure is
also significantly higher where sharp objects and instruments are used during
treatment because of the increased likelihood of accidental injuries drawing

250, 256 (1986). Generally, for transmission to occur, a concentrated amount of the virus must be
transmitted from an infected person into the blood stream of another. If infected bodily fluid comes
into contact with skin, transmission is still unlikely because "[i]ntact skin ... is an absolute barrier"
to the virus. Krim, The AIDS Virus and its Public Health Implications, in LEGAL, MEDICAL AND
GOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON AIDS AS A DISABILTY 3 (A.B.A. Commission of the Mentally

Disabled 1987). For the virus to be transmitted, infected fluid must come into contact with an
opening in the skin. Id. By all accounts it is improbable, but not impossible, for the virus to be
transmitted through purely casual contact. Id. However, a case study of two children revealed the
transmission of HIV from one child to the other by undocumented contact with blood or bodily
fluids. R.J. Simonds & Martha F. Rogers, HIV Prevention-Bringingthe Message Home, 329 NEw
ENO. J. MED. 1883 (1993).
28. See generally Mueller, supra note 27. While statistically the odds are low, the risk is
substantial due to the frequent exposure to blood and other bodily fluids. Id.
29. It is now apparent that it is rather difficult to transmit HIV by a direct needle-stick injury
from an HIV-infected patient to health care worker. See David K. Henderson et al., Risk of
NosocomialInfection with Human T-Cell Lymphotropic Virus Type IlllLymphadenopathy-Associated
Virus in a Large Cohort ofIntensively Exposed Health Care Workers, 104 ANNALS INTERNALMED.
644 (1986); McCray, supra note 8, at 1127; David K. Henderson, HW-1 in the Health Care Setting,
in PRINCIPLES AND PRACrICE OF INFuCrIOUS DISEASES 2221 (G.F. Mandell ed., 1989).

The risk of HIV infection by a needle stick is approximately 0.4%, indicating that it is highly
unusual to actually become infected, even by needle-stick exposure. Levine, supra note 20, at 442.
HIV is primarily intracellular, requiring that the health care worker actually be exposed to T4
lymphocytes that may be trapped on the end of the offending needle. Id. at 443. Further, only
approximately one in 1000, or one in 10,000 T4 cells, are actually infected at any one time in an
HIV-infected individual. See Mario Clerici et al., HIV-Specific T-HelperActivity in Seronegative
Health Care Workers Exposed to ContaminatedBlood, 271 JAMA 42 (1994); David D. Ho et al.,
Quanitationof Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 in the Blood of Infected Persons, 321 NEw
ENO. J. MED. 1621 (1989). It is thus apparent that the risk of HIV infection to a health care worker
is extremely small, even when accidentally stuck with an infected needle; the risk of acquiring
hepatitis B infection is far greater, for example, than is the risk of acquiring HIV from a needle-stick
injury. Levine, supra note 20, at 443.
30. Centers for Disease Control, supra note 27, at 4S-5S. While fewer than forty occupational
infections have been documented, the actual number may be higher. AIDS in Health Care Workers,
JONA, Mar. 1992, at 5.
31. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol29/iss1/5

Lawyer: HIV and Dentistry

1994]

HIV AND DENTISTRY

305

blood from health care workers.32
As a preliminary matter, health care workers who use universal
precautions33 and who do not perform invasive procedures'M present little risk
of HIV transmission to patients and are at minimal risk of being exposed to the
virus by a patient." More specifically, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
issued a document that quantifies the risk of HIV transmission from dentist to
patient.'
The CDC estimates that during dental procedures performed by a
dentist or an oral surgeon which result in patient bleeding,' the risk that a

32. Id. "Mhese [incidents of transmission] were among health workers who pricked
themselves with needles containing blood from an infected person or who were exposed to
contaminated blood through an open wound or on mucous membranes." Forum Interview with
Walter Dowdle: AIDS (Acquired Immunodeficency Syndrome), 11 WORLD HEALTH F. 388, 389
(1990).
33. "Universal precautions" is an approach to infection control where all human blood and
certain human body fluids are treated as if known to be infectious for HIV and other bloodborne
pathogens. Centers for Disease Control, supra note 2, at 2.
Office sterilization procedures involve the proper use of steam, dry heat, chemical vapor, and
gas sterilizers. See Chris H. Miller, Cleaning, Sterilization, and Disinfection: Basics of Microbial
Killing for Infection Control, 124 JADA 48, 48-56 (1993). The effectiveness of the procedures can
be routinely verified during office use by spore testing. Id. Disinfection is a less lethal process than
sterilization and is intended to kill disease-producing micro-organisms, but not bacterial spores. Id.
Office disinfection procedures involve using a liquid chemical at room temperature to kill
microorganisms on submerged instruments or operatory surfaces. Id. If the chemical used is not
sporicidal, it is called a disinfectant and can be expected to achieve only disinfection. Id.
Processing contaminated instruments for reuse on subsequent patients is a key part in patientprotection aspects of the office infection control program. The CDC and the ADA recommend that
surgical and other instruments that normally penetrate soft tissue or bone must be sterilized after
each use and that other instruments, burs, and handpieces that come into contact with oral tissue
should be sterilized after each use. Center for Disease Control, Recommended Infection-Control
Practicesfor Dentistry, 35 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 237-42 (1986); ADA Councils

on Dental Materials, Instruments and Equipment; Dental Practiceand Dental Therapeutics,Infection
ControlRecommendatonsforthe Dental Office and Dental Laboratory, 116 JADA 241-48 (1988).
The approach to sterilize all reusable instruments contaminated with blood or saliva (Universal
Sterilization), rather than to sterilize some and disinfect others, is the safest approach to preventing
disease spread to patients from instruments. Chris H. Miller, Sterilization: DisciplinedMicrobial
Control, 35 DENT. CUN. N. AM. 339-55 (1991). This is being recognized more and more, as
evidenced by laws in Ohio and Indiana requiring sterilization, rather than just disinfection of all
reusable dental instruments.

OHIO STATE DENTAL BOARD OF EXAMINERS, INFECTION CONTROL

RULES (Nov. 1, 1987); Ind. Pub. L. 123-1988 (codified in various sections of IND. CODE § 16-41
(1993)).
34. Invasive procedures involve "surgical entry into tissues, cavities, or organs or repair of
major traumatic injuries.' Centers for Disease Control, supra note 27, at 6.
35. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, DRAFT: ESTIMATES OF THE RISK OF ENDEMIC
TRANSMISSION OF HEPATITIS B VIRUS AND HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS TO PATIENTS BY
THE PERCUTANEOUS ROUTE DURING INVASIVE SURGICAL AND DENTAL PROCEDURES (Jan 30, 1991)
[hereinafter DRAFT).

36. Id.
37. Id. at 1.
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patient will be infected by an HIV-positive dentist in general practice ranges
from 1 in 263,158 to 1 in 2,631,579.' s The risk that a patient will be infected
by an HIV-positive oral surgeon ranges from 1 in 41,667 to 1 in 416,667.3
Based on these figures, the CDC estimates that during the years 1981 through
1990, only between ten and one hundred patients were infected with HIV by
dentists.'
However, the CDC noted that its ability to estimate risk in the
dental-care setting was hampered by the lack of prospective studies on the
frequency of percutaneous injuries4' in dental workers and the percentage of
such injuries which result in possible exposure of a patient to the workers'
blood.' Additionally, many have criticized the CDC study and its underlying
assumptions, ' suggesting that the actual instances of transmission are much
lower." By all reports, the probability that any patient will contract HIV from
an infected dentist is very low.' s Furthermore, the transmission of the disease
in the dental setting can largely be halted if proper precautions are taken.'
Because the virus is communicable, incurable, capable of mutation,4 7 and fatal,

38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 8.
Id. at 7.
Id. at tbl. 2.
Percutaneous injuries arm puncture wounds caused by a sharp instrument or object during

treatment.

42. DRAFT, supra note 35, at 8.
43. Testifying through one of its members at the CDC Conference on Health Care Worker
Guidelines on February 21, 1991, the AIDS Action Council (AAC) argued that the CDC's study
relies on unfounded assumptions. The AAC contended that the CDC had no basis for its assumption
that sharp instruments or needles that cause percutaneous injury to the dentist recontact the patient
at a 32% rate. Ruth Finkelsteinm, AIDS Action Council Testimony Presented to the Centersfor
Disease Control (Feb. 21, 1991). This figure was derived by CDC observers who conducted a
prospective investigation of surgical procedures at four hospitals. Because of the vast range of
recontact rates noted in CDC's small sample (range among medical specialties, 8%-57%; range

among hospitals, 24%-42%), the 32% figure is problematic even for surgery. The AAC also
criticized the CDC modelling assumptions that reied on studies spanning a ten-year period and
ignored changes in the use of universal precautions. Id. at 3-5.
44. Dr. Henry Finger, President of the Academy of General Dentistry, criticized an estimate
of patient risk presented in the CDC's draft document in a March 11, 1991, letter to the CDC,
which is discussed in Zev Remba, HIV, AGD IMPACT, June 1991, at 16, 20.
45. It is important to note that the CDC report did not estimate the risk posed to a dentist by
an infected patient. Reports state that the risk to a surgeon from operating on an HIV-infected
patient ranges from 1 in 4500 to 1 in 130,000. See Michael D. Hagen et al., Routine Preoperative
Screeningfor HIV: Does the Risk to the Surgeon Outweigh the Risk to the Patient?, 259 JAMA
1357, 1358 (1988) (stating that, surprisingly, there would be far fewer instances of health care
worker-to-patient transmission than of transmission from patient to health care worker).

46. See supra note 33.
47. See Aidspeak: From New Tests to New Viruses, TIME, Feb. 8, 1988, at 56-57 (reporting

that researchers in the United States have identified a new strain of the virus that is sometimes not
detected by the current tests for HIV-1). Mutation poses a significant threat because new strains of
the HIV virus may go undetected by current HIV virus tests such as the enzyme-linked

immunosorbent assay (ELISA). Id. Moreover, such mutations jeopardize the potential effectiveness
of any cure or vaccine developed for a specific strain of the HIV virus. Id.
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immediate action by legislatures and dental associations is warranted to
encourage or require these precautions designed to protect the public's health
and safety.
I1.

CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW

AND AMEPJCAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION POLICIES

As the HIV crisis grows, so do the problems it poses to our legal system.
An effective vaccine or cure for the virus is unlikely to reach the market for
several more years. Indeed such a medical solution to the HIV crisis may elude
researchers for decades.' Therefore, for the next several years, public health
officials must rely upon measures such as easing the public's fear through
education and prevention to stem the rising number of deaths from HIV."9
With that end in mind, health departments and legislators have proposed a
variety of means to control the spread of this fatal disease.'
In the wake of the Kimberly Bergalis tragedy," legislators searched for
ways to restore public confidence in the health care system and to ease the
52
outcry for government regulation of HIV-positive health care workers.
Before her death, Ms. Bergalis testified before the House Subcommittee on
Health and the Environment of the Committee on Energy and Commerce in
support of a bill that would require virtually all doctors and other health care
workers to be tested for HIV. 3 However, the proposed Kimberly Bergalis

48. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 256-60 and accompanying text.
50. The measures have included various regulations governing education. See Ind. Pub. L. No.
123-1988 (codified as IND. CODE § 20-8.1-11 (1988)). Other measures concern disclosure of HIVpositive conditions to health departments, health care providers, and others. See, e.g., CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 199.215, 199.25 (West Supp. 1989) (permitting physicians to disclose
the identity of HIV carriers to their spouses and people who the physicians reasonably believe share
needles or have sexual relations with the carriers).
51. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. E2377 (daily ed. June 26, 1991) (proposed Kimberly Bergalis
Patient and Health Provider Protection Act of 1991).
53. See H.R. 2788, 102d Cong., 1st Seas. (1991) (proposing the establishment of protections
against transmission of certain communicable diseases for both health care workers and patients);
see also Prevention of HIV Transmission: Hearings on H.R. 2788 Before the SubComm. on Health
and the Environment of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 128 (1991)
(statement of Kimberly Bergalis); 137 CONG. REc. E2377 (daily ed. June 26, 1991) (proposed
Kimberly Bergalis Patient and Health Provider Protection Act of 1991). According to the Bergalis
Act, health care workers testing positive for one of the enumerated diseases would be prohibited
from performing the medical and dental procedures listed by the Health and Human Services
Department for the duration of the infection. H.R. 2788, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1991)
(proposed § 2648A(b)(2)(A)). The proposal required notification to past patients of their possible
exposure to HIV and other listed diseases when a health care worker tested positive for any such
disease. Id. (proposed § 2648A(c)(1)). The proposal also authorized health care workers involved
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Patient and Health Provider Protection Act of 1991' was not enacted. In fact,
Congress has yet to enact any law mandating large-scale testing of health care
workers.55 This inaction may be because most of the proposed legislation
ignores the enormous financial and administrative burdens imposed by
mandatory screening programs in light of the small risk of transmission from
infected health care workers to patients.'
However, Congress has passed a
law 7 requiring state legislatures to enact practice guidelines for HIV-positive

in procedures encompassing a risk of viral transmission to perform nonconsensualtesting on patients
under certain conditions. Id. (proposed § 2648B(b)).
However, the cost of testing alone would be enormous, approximately $65 per person who
tests negative and $250 per person who tests positive. See Larry Gostin, Symposium on AIDS and
the Rights and Obligations of Health Care Workers: Hospitals, Health Care Professionals, and
AIDS: The "Right to Know" the Health Status of Professionalsand Patients, 48 MD. L. REv. 12,
50 (1989). Because of the high level of false positive and negative results, the expensive and timeconsuming tests would have to be administered twice, making the utility of mass screening highly
questionable. Id.
While the Bergalis Act sought to minimize HIV transmission in the health care setting, the
means adopted to achieve this end were highly invasive of individual privacy interests. The proposal
called for the systematic collection and disclosure of extremely personal information from both
patients and health care workers, information that forecasted serious consequences for patients'
future health. H.R. 2788, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (1991) (proposed §§ 2648A & 2648B). This
invasiveness was further exploited by the complete absence of strict confidentiality protections.
Thus, in calling for testing and disclosure provisions without corresponding confidentiality
protections, the proposed act lacked a key means of safeguarding individual privacy interests. For
a more detailed discussion of the Bergalis Act, see Jeffery W. Cavender, Note, AIDS in the Health
Care Setting: The CongressionalResponse to the Kimberly Bergalis Case, 26 GA. L. REv. 539
(1992).
54. 137 CONG. REc. E2377 (daily ed. June 26, 1991).
55. See H.R. 2788, 102d Cong., 1st Seas. (1991) (bill sponsored by Rep. William E.
Dannemeyer).
56. There are 4.5 million health care workers in the United States. Of these, the CDC
estimates that approximately 360 surgeons, 1200 dentists, 5000 physicians, and 35,000 other health
care workers are HIV positive. Betsy A. Lehman, AIDS Tests for Health Caregivers?, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug, 10, 1992, at 27.
57. See Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriation Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-141,'§ 633, 105 Stat. 834, 876 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300ee-2) (detailing the steps that
states must take regarding prevention of HIV and hepatitis-B virus transmission to avoid becoming
ineligible for assistance under the Public Health Service Act). Senator Jesse Helms, a North
Carolina Republican, originally succeeded in persuading the Senate to pass an amendment to this
Appropriations Act that would have made it a federal crime for health care workers who know they
are HIV-positive to perform invasive medical procedures without informing patients. See 137 CONG.
REC. S10, 363 (daily ed. July, 18, 1991) (listing results of the vote on the Helms amendment). The
pertinent section reads:
(a) Whoever, being a registered physician, dentist, nurse, or other health care provider,
knowing that he is infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, intentionally
provides medical or dental treatment to another person, without prior notification to such
person of such infection, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not less
than ten years, or both.
137 CONG. REc. S9778 (daily ed. July 11, 1991). Although Helms' initiative passed in the Senate,
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a conference committee subsequently rejected the amendment. 137 CONo. REC. H7385 (daily ed.
Oct. 3, 1991).
According to one source, the Helms amendment was killed "because it was recognized up
front that the House would never accept it with that language in it." See Joyce Price, AIDS Testing
Likely to Pass, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1991, at A3 (quoting Bob Maynes, spokesperson for
Senator Dennis DeConcini, ranking Democrat on conference committee). As commonly pointed out
during the debates on the proposal, requiring actual knowledge may discourage health care workers
in high risk groups from voluntarily submitting to testing. 137 CONG. REC. S10, 332 (daily ed. July
18, 1991) (quoting Senator Edward M. Kennedy from Massachusetts as arguing that the Helms
amendment " [ c] ould seriously undermine the willingness of health care workers to seek HIV testing
when they know they have been placed at risk"). By avoiding the requisite knowledge for
punishment under the proposal, high-risk health care workers could continue their practice without
fear of possible criminal sanction. Id. Opponents thus argued that by discouraging voluntary
testing, such a proposal would actually increase the likelihood of viral transmission. Id. Senator
Kennedy stated:
[M]any more Americans are more likely to be unknowingly exposed to AIDS if
their doctor faces a 10-year jail sentence, than if careful, considered review were available to guide
that doctor into safe practices under the CDC guidelines." Id.
Furthermore, seropositive health care professionals know that any mention of their health
status to patients would mean almost certain death for their practices. See 137 CONG. REC. S1O,
341 (daily ed. July 18, 1991) (quoting statement of Senator Durenberger saying that "because of the
fear and ignorance [surrounding the AIDs epidemic,] disclosure of HIV status is tantamount to
forcing [a health care worker] to withdraw from practice all together"). The health care industry
would face large expense increases in retraining and replacing valuable health care professionals
unnecessarily excluded from practicing because of forced disclosure provisions. 137 CONG. REC.
S1O, 344 (daily ed. July 18, 1991) (reprinting letter to Senator Kennedy). The American Hospital
Association also stressed that penalties and practice restrictions for HIV-infected health care workers
who pose no risk to their patients could result in a shortage of personnel available to care not only
for HIV-infected patients, but for all patients living in areas with a high prevalence of the virus.
Id. As a result of such a provision, non-infected health care professionals would possibly become
even more reluctant to treat AIDS-infected patients for fear of contracting the virus and consequently
losing their practices. 137 CONG. REC. S9784 (daily ed. July 11, 1991) (reprinting Doctors with
AIDS, NEwsWEEK, July 1, 1991, which reported a study of medical residents finding that two-thirds
of the residents said they did not plan to treat people with AIDS and that 74% of the residents would
not give lifesaving treatment to scropositive patients if the risk of infection to the residents was one
in 100). Finally, the proposal sought no promotion of public awareness or education regarding
possible transmission in the health care setting. Id.
Instead of accepting the Helms proposal, the conference committee adopted an amendment
introduced by Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.) that had previously passed by unanimous consent in
the Senate. 137 CONG. REC. SIO, 348-50 (daily ed. July 18, 1991) (providing language of Senator
Dole's amendment and listing the results of the vote on the amendment). Section 633 of the
Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 1992 subsequently
incorporated the substance of Senator Dole's amendment and was enacted into law. Pub. L. No.
102-141 § 633, 105 Stat. 834, 876 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300ee-2). For a detailed discussion and
analysis of the Helms and Dole amendments, see Cavender, supra note 53, at 539.
58. See Centers for Disease Control, supra note 2, at 5 (1991) (reprinting the CDC guidelines).
Specifically, the CDC guidelines call for strict adherence to universal precautions in all surgical
procedures with specific guidelines for exposure-prone procedures. Id. at 4. The guidelines do not
require mandatory testing of health care workers, but instead urge them to undergo voluntary testing
for HIV infection. Id. According to the guidelines, health care workers who test positive for the
virus should generally refrain from practicing "exposure-prone" procedures. Id. at 5. Interestingly,
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states may adopt either the CDC guidelines as presented or other guidelines
equivalent to those of the CDC.59 Additionally, federal law requires each
state's public health official to certify that guidelines have been instituted in the
state.'
Failure to issue such guidelines will render the state ineligible for

the CDC leaves to each hospital and institution the responsibility of defining for itself what
procedures should be classified as "exposure-prone." Id. Thus, the guidelines would not prevent
seropositive health care workers from practicing invasive procedures not likely to expose patients
to the virus if such professionals practice proper surgical techniques, follow universal precautions,
and obey proper sterilization techniques. Id. Furthermore, an infected health care worker may
perform exposure-prone procedures only after seeking the counsel of an expert review panel that had
advised the health care worker as to the circumstances, if any, under which continuation of such
procedures would be appropriate. Id. Such circumstances would include notifying prospective
patients of the health care worker's seropositivity before they undergo exposure-prone procedures.
Id. In instances where an HIV-positive health care worker performs an exposure-prone procedure
without the patient's consent, postoperative notification of the patient should be decided on a caseby-case basis. Id. at 6.
These guidelines are geared toward preventing HIV transmission both from patient to health
care provider and from provider to patient. Through forced adoption of infection control techniques,
the Dole Amendment seeks to apply the most effective methods of preventing HIV transmission to
patient or health care worker in all medical procedures. At the heart of the amendment is the belief
that the low risk of viral transmission during invasive procedures and the high cost of testing do not
support the diversion of funds necessary for a mandatory periodic testing program. Instead, the
CDC believes that full implementation of universal precautions and proper safety training can
substantially reduce the already low risk of viral transmission during invasive procedures. However,
critics have pointed out that certain aspects of the CDC guidelines, such as those dealing with
exposure-prone procedures, are quite general in scope and will be hard to implement with any
uniformity on a national basis. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REc. $10, 358 (daily ed. July 18, 1991)
(debate discussion of Senator Durenberger). The Dole Amendment may be further criticized for its
lack of specific guidelines regarding financing, implementing, and enforcing nationwide adoption
of the CDC guidelines. It fails to specify whether states will receive additional financial assistance
for enforcing compliance with all CDC infection control guidelines. The cost of following all of the
CDC recommendations for infection control is extremely high. One dentist estimated his cost of full
implementation at between $15,000 to $25,000 per year. Gideon Gil, Kentucky Dentists Attend
AIDS-Education Program and Hear Comforting News, LOUISVILLE COURIER J., Apr. 6, 1991, at
AS. Such prohibitive costs may dissuade some health care workers from full implementation unless
strict enforcement measures are adopted.
59. The statute reads in pertinent part:
[E]ach State Public Health Official shall, not later than one year after the date of
enactment of this Act, certify to the Secretary of Health and Human Services that
guidelines issued by the Centers for Disease Control, or guidelines which are equivalent
to those promulgated by the Centers for Disease Control, concerning recommendations
for preventing the transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus and the hepatitis
B virus during exposure prone invasive procedures. . have been instituted in the State.
Pub. L. No. 102-141, § 633, 105 Stat. 834, 876 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §300ee-2).
60. Pub. L. No. 102-141, §633, 105 Stat. 834, 876 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §300ee-2)
(stipulating that guidelines apply to all health officials practicing within states and that compliance
with the guidelines is the responsibility of state public health officials).
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federal monies under the Public Health Service Act.61
In response to the transmission of HIV from Dr. Acer to Ms. Bergalis and
five of his other patients in Florida, the ADA's Board of Trustees adopted the
"ADA Interim Policy on HIV-lnfected Dentists" in 1991.'
The policy
generally stated that because no scientific evidence existed to indicate that HIVpositive health care providers posed an identifiable risk of HIV transmission to
their patients, the recommended infection control procedures were effective in
preventing transmission of the virus.' The policy did, however, recommend
that seropositiveM6 dentists either refrain from performing invasive procedures
or disclose their condition to patients until more evidence is gathered as to. the
risk of transmission in a dental setting.' It further stated that the ADA would
"assist and support infected dentists in sustaining meaningful professional
careers. 66

61. Id. (providing an ineligibility requirement that allows for the extension of the time period
where a state shows that additional time is required to institute guidelines); see also Public Health
Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 210 to 300aaa-13 (1988) (detailing organization, function, and powers
of Public Health Service).
62. The Interim Policy reads as follows:
The dental profession has long adhered to a moral commitment of service to the
public and an ethical obligation to protect the health of the patient. An advisory opinion
to the American Dental Association's Code of Professional Conduct urges dentists who
become ill or impaired to limit the activities of practice to those areas that do not
endanger either patients or dental staff.
Currently, there is no scientific evidence to indicate that HIV-positive health care
providers pose an identifiable risk of HIV transmission to their patients. There has been
only one documented case of transmission from an HIV-infected health care provider
to patients during the past 10 years of experience with AIDS, an indication that the risk
is infinitesimal. The ADA continues to believe that the recommended infection control
procedures are effective in preventing transmission of infection.
However, the recent case of possible HIV transmission from dentist to patient has
raised some uncertainty about the risk of transmission from health care provider to
patient. While there is evidence that this dental practice did not consistently adhere to
all recommended guidelines for prevention of disease transmission, the precise
mechanism of transmission in this case remains unknown. This uncertainty leads to the
conclusion that the foremost concern of the dental profession must continue to be
protection of the patient. Thus, until the uncertainty about transmission is resolved, the
ADA believes that HIV-infected dentist[s] should refrain from performing invasive
procedures or should disclose their seropositive status.
The American Dental Association will assist and support infected dentists in
sustaining meaningful professional careers.
AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION, INTERIM POLICY ON HIV-INFECTED DENTISTS, reprinted in A
Letter of Importance, JADA, Feb. 1991, at 8.
63. Id. This is generally accepted among experts. Unfortunately, many dentists are not strictly
following the recommended infection control procedures. See supra note 33.
.64. This term refers to persons carrying HIV.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 35-42.
66. See supra note 62.
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Although directly responding to the Bergalis tragedy was a positive step,
the Interim Policy proved to be little comfort to patients and dentists. It failed
to provide concrete guidelines for what actions should be taken by seropositive
dentists until more research became available. The policy told seropositive
dentists that the ADA would support them, but that they should refrain from
practicing until further study is completed. No support networks or procedures
were created. Thus, the policy provided little incentive for seropositive dentists
to disclose their conditions to either their patients or the ADA. Additionally, the
policy did not mandate compliance with strict sterilization procedures and did
not impose disciplinary action upon those not following accepted infection
control techniques. Further, it mentioned nothing about improving and requiring
other preventive measures and education for dentists and patients. Perhaps most
importantly, the policy did not address seropositive patients at all and did not
outline the duty of care owed to them by dentists. Therefore, the Interim Policy
was the first step in acknowledging the problem, but it did not provide a solution
or plan for lowering incidents of transmission in dental settings.
The ADA later adopted a series of resolutions aimed at satisfying some of
the vacancies left by the Interim Policy.' These resolutions are more specific

67. Ie resolutions state:
Resolved, that the American Dental Association take the necessary action to encourage
disability insurance coverage and benefits for dentists who test HIV seropositive and no
longer practice dentistry because of their HIV status.
AMERiCAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION, RESLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE ADA GENERAL HOUSE OF
DELBATS RELATING TO ASSOCIATION'S AIDS POLICY, 1992:55H (1992).

Resolved, that the American Dental Association direct the appropriate councils to
investigate the risk of opportunistic infection of HIV-positive/AIDS patients at various
stages of the disease and develop a protocol which would act as a guide to the dental
practitioner in the following areas:
2. Evaluation of individual procedures which would best be avoided based on the
results of those tests and for patients who exhibit various signs and symptoms of
progressive stages of the disease.
3. Determination of which patients would best be treated in a more controlled
environment than is possible in the normal dental office and would therefore make
referral of these patients an ethical obligation.
Id. at 1992:92H.
Resolved, that if the government mandates HIV testing and disclosure for health care
workers, the ADA Council on Governmental Affairs and Federal Dental Services
investigate and pursue national legislative possibilities, that would guarantee reasonable
financial compensation to health care workers who may be discriminated against upon
disclosure of being tested HIV positive.
Id. at 1992:134H.
Resolved, that the ADA is opposed to any laws or regulations that require mandatory
HIV testing of dentists and other health care workers.
Id. at 1991:595.
Resolved, that the American Dental Association Policy on HIV-Infected Dentists read
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as follows:
The dental profession has long adhered to a moral commitment of service
to the public and an ethical obligation to protect the health of the patient. An
advisory opinion to the American Dental Association's Code of Professional
Conduct urges dentists who become ill or impaired to limit the activities of
practice to those areas that do not endanger either patients or dental staff.
Currently, there is no scientific evidence to indicate that HIV-infected health
care providers pose an identifiable risk of HIV transmission to their patients.
There has been only one alleged case of transmission from an HIV-infected health
care provider to patients during the past ten years of experience with HIV disease,
an indication that the risk is infinitesimal. The ADA strongly affirms that
universal precautions are an effective and adequate means of preventing the
transmission of MIV from dental health care worker to patient and patient to
dental health care worker.
However, since the foremost concern of the dental profession must continue
to be protection of the patient, the Association strongly encourages all dental
health care workers to undergo personal assessments to determine the need for
HIV testing. Dental health care workers who believe they are at risk of HIV
infection should monitor their HIV serostatus. All HIV-seropositive dental health
care workers who perform procedures viewed to have identifiable risk should
practice only under the evaluation and monitoring of their personal physician
and/or under recommendations of public health officials, expert review panels, or
in compliance with institutional policies. HIV infection alone does not justify the
limiting of professional duties, or automatically mandate disclosure, unless the
dental health care worker poses a risk of transmitting infection through noncompliance with universal precautions, a lack of infection control competence, or
presents signs of functional impairment. If the HIV-infected dentist discontinues
the practice of dentistry, the Association believes the dentist to be totally disabled
with respect to the practice of dentistry.
The American Dental Association will assist and support infected dentists
in sustaining meaningful professional careers.
and be it further,
Resolved, that appropriate agencies of the Association continue their efforts to educate
the public about the efficacy of universal precautions and the infinitesimal risk of
contracting HIV infection during the course of dental treatment, and be it further
Resolved, that the appropriate agencies of the Association continue to monitor studies
and the policies, reports and guidelines developed by major health care organizations,
CDC and other groups, with a report back to the 1992 House of Delegates.
Id. at 1991:592.
The Association believes that all HIV-infected patients should disclose their HIV status
and medical history: dentists, like physicians, need to know every patient's medical
history in order to make appropriate treatment decisions that are in the best interests of
the patient. For the same reason, the Association also strongly supports state and
federal legislation that gives an HIV-infected patient's health care providers the right to
share knowledge of the patient's HIV status and current medical condition without
risking a violation of state or federal anti-discrimination laws and H1V confidentiality
laws. The Association further strongly supports state and federal legislation that protects
a dentist from charges of discrimination if a dentist, in a sincere effort to protect a
patient's health, elects to refrain from treating a patient who fails to disclose his/her HIV
status and medical history or allow an HV test to be performed.
The Association urges dentists to maintain strict confidentiality of the patient's
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and provide a better prediction of the ADA's future stance on some of the
difficult issues developing from HIV transmission in dental settings. The
resolutions clearly state that the ADA believes all seropositive patients should
disclose their conditions and medical histories before any kind of dental
treatment is rendered.' Dentists, like physicians, need to know every patient's
complete medical history to make appropriate treatment decisions that are in the
patient's best interest.69 In addition, the ADA supports legislation that permits
seropositive patients' health care providers to share knowledge of the patients'
conditions with each other and that protects dentists from charges of
discrimination for refusing to treat patients who fail to disclose their HIV
positive conditions and medical histories.'
The resolutions address the
separate issues surrounding seropositive dentists, as well as seropositive patients.
The resolutions discuss the need for proper diagnoses and critical evaluations of
seropositive patients' conditions to determine proper treatment.7'
The
resolutions acknowledge that seropositive patients must receive special
consideration when determining treatment because their immune systems do not
function normally,' causing them to be at risk of developing infection from
bacteria and germs exposed during dental treatment that healthy patients
naturally resist.'
What is a simple infection or a minor cold to a healthy
patient can be a serious, if not fatal, illness to an HIV carrier.74 The
resolutions make the referral of these high risk patients an ethical obligation.!
The resolutions also state that the ADA is strongly opposed to any laws or
regulations that would require mandatory testing of dentists and other health care

HIV status and medical condition, except as noted above with respect to sharing of
information among the patient's health care providers when allowed by state or federal
law....
The Association believes that individuals with HIV infection should have access
to dental treatment. Treatment considerations should provide for a judicious balance
between the well-being of these patients and the protection of the health of the public
as well as the dental care providers.
Id. at 1991:591.
68. See AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 67, at Resolution 1991:591.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at Resolution 1992:92H.
72. See generally Levine, supra note 20.
73. Id. Many kinds of bacteria and germs may be present in the mouth during dental treatment
because the dentist may clean decay and puss from abscesses on teeth and gums. These organisms
are released into the mouth during treatment.
74. Id.
75. See AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 67, at Resolution 1992:92H.
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workers.76 Rather, the ADA encourages all dental health workers to undergo
personal assessments to determine the need for HIV testing.' Workers who
believe they are at risk of HIV infection should monitor their serostatus
individually.' All seropositive workers performing procedures viewed to have
an identifiable risk of transmission should practice only under the evaluation and

76. Id. at Resolution 1991:595. This opposition largely stems from the concern that testing
would impose an unacceptable financial and practical burden on dentists. Screening would need to
be administered periodically, perhaps annually or semi-annually. There could be no assurance that
a dentist, having once tested negative, had not subsequently become infected or seroconverted. See
generally Martha A. Field, Testing for AIDS: Uses and Abuses, 16 AM. J.L. & MED., 33, 41
(1990). It is also possible that the dentist could be infected at the time of the test but had not yet
formed antibodies to the virus. Id. Thus, the dentist would test negative but would still be infected
and infectious. Id. See generally Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Case Against Compulsory
Casefinding in Controlling AIDS-Testing, Screening, and Reporting, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 7
(1986). The rationale for mandatory screening is that public health officials would be able to
identify those dentist who are unaware of their own infection, as well as those who are aware of but
refuse to disclose their infection. See Steven Eisenstat, An Analysis of the Rationalityof Mandatory
Testing for the HIV Antibody: Balancing the Governmental Public Health Interests with the
Individual's Privacy Interest, 52 U. Prrr. L. REv. 327, 347-48 (1991); Larry Gostin, The HVInfected Health Care Professional: Public Policy, Discrimination, and Patient Safety, 18 LAw,
MED. & HEALTH CARE 303 (1990). Once identified, these dentists could be prohibited from
performing invasive procedures without disclosing their condition to their patients. For further
discussion of mandatory screening, see Frank S. Rhame & Dennis G. Maki, The Casefor Wider Use
of Testing for HIV Infection, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1248, 1250 (1989); Ronald Bayer et al., HIV
Antibody Screening: An Ethical Frameworkfor Evaluating Proposed Programs,256 JAMA 1768
(1986); Harvey V. Fineberg, Screeningfor HIV Infection and Public Health Policy, 18 LAw, MED
& HEALTH CARE 29 (1990); Barney, supra note 8, at 933.
77. See AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 67, at Resolution 1991:592.
78. Id. The United Kingdom took a similar approach in coping with seropositive dentists even
before the incident with Dr. Acer. On January 13, 1988, the General Dental Council in the United
Kingdom stated its position in the following terms:
1. There has been considerable public concern about the risk of contracting AIDS and,
more recently, about the possibility that patients might be infected by doctors or dentists
who are themselves suffering from AIDS or are HIV positive. There is no known
instance of transmission of the AIDS virus from dentist to patient in the course of
treatment. The risk of cross-infection in dental surgery has always existed. Dentists
have a duty to understand the risk and the precautions which must be taken to avoid it.
2. It is the ethical responsibility of dentists who believe that they have been infected
with HIV to obtain medical advice and, if found to be infected, to submit to regular
medical supervision. Their medical supervision will include counselling, in particular,
in respect of any changes in their practice which might be considered appropriate in the
best interests of protecting their patients. It is the duty of such dentists to act upon the
medical advice they have been given, which may include the necessity to cease the
practice of dentistry altogether or to modify their practice in some way.
3. Dentists who know that they are, or believe that they may be, HIV positive and who
might jeopardize the well being of their patients by failing to obtain appropriate medical
advice or to act upon the advice that has been given to them are behaving unethically
and contrary to their obligations to patients. Behavior of this kind may raise a question
of serious professional misconduct.
UNITED KINGDOM GENERAL DENTAL COUNCIL (Jan. 13, 1988).
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supervision "of their personal physician and/or under recommendations of public
health officials, expert review panels, or in compliance with institutional
policies."" The resolutions further state that HIV infection alone does not
justify limiting professional duties or automatically mandating disclosure unless
the dental health care worker poses a risk of transmitting infection to patients or
other workers as a result of non-compliance with universal precautions, a lack
of infection control competence,s" or signs of functional impairment."'
In an advisory opinion issued by the Council on Ethics, Bylaws, and
Judicial Affairs, the ADA stated that dentists have an ethical duty to treat
seropositive patients unless "the patient's health status would be significantly
compromised by the provision of dental treatment."' In such cases, referrals

79. See AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 67, at Resolution 1991:592. In reality,
this recommendationis too vague to be helpful. For example, the resolution mentions expert review
panels, but does not elaborate on or create such panels. Id.
80. Universal precautions and infection control guidelines are mandated through the OSHA
Industry Standards, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030 (1992). These Industry Standards outline sterilization
procedures for the office and equipment, appropriate attire for all personnel in the office, vaccination
requirements for Hepatitis B, training requirements for all personnel, and record keeping procedures
for incidents of exposure. Id. The sterilization requirements are stringent, including regulations for
decontamination, disposal of infectious waste, and barrier protectors. Id. However, 'some dentists
find the regulations difficult to follow. See infra note 85.
81. See AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 67, at Resolution 199:592. A recent case
of alleged H1V transmission from a health care professional to his patients has renewed interest in
disclosure of the HIV status of physicians. See Centers for Disease Control, Possible Transmission
of Human Immunodeficiency Virus to a Patient Duringan Invasive Dental Procedure, 39 MORBIDrY
& MORTAIrY WKLY. REP. 489 (1990); Centers for Disease Control, Update: Transmission ofH1V
Infection During Invasive Dental Procedures-Florida, 40 MoRBIDrrY & MORTALrY WKLY. REP.
377 (1991). As a result of this single case, health departments, hospitals, and other medical
institutions have implemented "lookback" policies, whereby they notify the former patients of
physicians who die from HIV-related conditions. For some examples of lookbacks performed by
medical institutions, see Jean Latz Griffin, Dental Student Has HIV, Patients Told, CHI. TRiB., July
24, 1991, at CI (reporting that a dental school notified patients that they had been treated by an
HIV-positive dental student); Doctor Died ofAIDS, Hospital Tells Parents, N.Y. TINEs, Apr. 11,
1991, at A16 (reporting that a hospital notified the parents of 59 patients that a medical resident had
died of AIDS). An institution's decision to perform a "lookback" may reduce the number of people
exposed to HIV as a result of medical workplace exposures and may also reduce the cost of
subsequent lawsuits.
82. The provision states:
A dentist has the general obligation to provide care to those in need. A decision not to
provide treatment to an individual because the individual has AIDS or is HIV
seropositive, based solely on that fact, is unethical. Decisions with regard to the type
of dental treatment provided or referrals made or suggested, in such instances, should
be made on the same basis as they are made with other patients, that is, whether the
individual dentist believes he or she has need of another's skills, knowledge, equipment
or experience and whether the dentist believes, after consultation with the patient's
physician if appropriate, the patient's health status would be significantly compromised
by the provision of dental treatment.
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should be made to those dental specialists who are equipped to safely treat
special-needs patients.s'
All of these policies contain important information and are a good beginning
to manage HIV in dentistry. However, the policies are vague and provide little
help in implementing the conclusions drawn by the ADA. For instance, the
policies have little authority to force dentists to accept their professional
responsibility to treat HIV patients and to monitor their own serostatus.
Furthermore, the policies have no authority to enforce the stringent sterilization
and training procedures outlined in the OSHA Industry Standards.' Also, the
policies do not include an outline of disciplinary proceedings that could result
from failure to follow the infection control regulations. Finally, the policies
insufficiently emphasize the dire need for better education for both the patients
and the dentists. Therefore, the current legislation and dental association
policies are incomplete and incongruent. For example, while one pushes for
mandatory testing, the other resists such efforts. These groups must work
together toward minimizing the risk of transmission in the dental setting by
establishing the duties and responsibilities of seropositive dentists and patients.
Dentists and patients must be willing to sacrifice some degree of privacy and

COUNCIL ON ETHICS, BYLAWS, AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS,
ADVISORY OPINION (1988) [hereinafter ADVISORY OPINION].

AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION,

The American Medical Association (AMA) has adopted a similar policy concerning the
treatment of seropositive patients. The AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs determined
that "when an epidemic prevails, the physician must continue his labors without regard to the risk
to his own health ....
[A] physician may not ethically refuse to treat a patient whose condition
is within the physician's realm of competence" because the patient is HIV-infected. Centers for
Disease Control, CoWIcil Says DoctorsHave Obligationto TreatAIDS Patients,AIDS WKLY., Jan.
11, 1988, at 10. The AMA also recently developed physician guidelines for the treatment of HIV
patients. Laurie Jones & Deborah Shelton Pikney, Help on the Way for Treating Growing HIV
Epidemic, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 7, 1994, at 7.
83. ADVISORY OPINION, supra note 82.

84. David Lewis, an environmental microbiologist at the University of Georgia in Athens,
maintains that dental handpieces attached to a leaky piece of dental equipment known as a "prophy
(lactic) angle" can transfer at least 50 times more blood than a needle stick in just five minutes of
operation during routine treatments to clean and polish teeth. See Breo, supra note 2, at 2732-33.
The prophy angle, which is connected to the head used to clean teeth, is a metal joint that gives a
dentist the proper angle to maneuver within the mouth: Id. at 2733. Lewis theorizes that Dr. Acer
treated himself or one of his infected partners with this device, failed to properly sterilize it, and oral
detritus, including blood and saliva with HIV, passed from patient to patient through the leaky
prophy angle. Id. at 2733. Heat sterilization kills HIV and other infectious agents, hut Lewis fears
that 10% of all dentists do not adequately sterilize their devices. Id. With this assumption, he
theorizes that AIDS and Hepatitis B cases that are not attributed to traditional risk factors may, in
fact, be due to infection in a dental office. Id. "It is terribly difficult to track these unidentified
AIDS ... cases back to the dentist's office and that is why dentists must be made to comply with
heat sterilization procedures." Id. See 20/20 (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 1, 1993).
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comfort to reduce the risk of transmission for all those involved.&

85. Many dentists resist efforts to implement testing programs and to enforce strict sterilization
procedures because of the cost. J. Randoph Mullins & Paul B. Harrison, 7he Questionable Utility
of Mandatory Screeningfor the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 166 AM. J. SURGERY 676 (1993).
Many dentists with small practices, especially dentists practicing in areas where the presence of HIV
is virtually non-existent, feel that the cost in updating equipment and training staff to meet the
standards is not justified by the minute risk of HIV. These dentists fear that raising their fees as a
result of updating equipment will cause many patients to cease seeking dental treatment except when
seriously needed.
The use of gloves, masks, and gowns by dentists has increased throughout the practice of
dentistry over time. Kent D. Nash, How Infection ControlProceduresareAffecting DentalPractice
Today, JADA, Mar. 1992, at 67. Eyewear, both protective and corrective, has been used by about
80% of dentists since 1986 and has remained relatively steady since then. Id. at 68. In 1986,
slightly more than 20% of dentists reported using gloves on all patients, and about the same
percentage indicated using a mask. Id. Only about 12% said they wore gowns for all patients. Id.
Five years later, the picture had changed dramatically. Id. at 69. By 1991, more than 60% of
dentists indicated using gloves, masks, gowns, or eyewear for all patients. Id. Use of gloves has
risen to more than 90% among dentists, hygienists, and dental assistants. Id. Mask utilization has
climbed to more than 60% of dentists and assistants, and more than 75% of hygienists. Id. Use
of gowns took a significant jump in 1991, when 64% of dentists, more than 75% of hygienists, and
about 60% of assistants reported using them. Id.
Guidelines for using barrier techniques are intended to boost the overall safety of patients,
dentists, and dental team members. Id. at 70. Their adoption affects treatment procedures rendered
in the dental office, practice costs, and fees charged to patients. Id. Early on, practitioners
probably absorbed the costs of barrier techniques by adjusting the rate at which the techniques were
adopted, lowering net earnings, or offsetting adjustments in other expenses. Id. at 71. More
recently, there have been signs that dentists are beginning to pass on these added costs to patients
in the form of higher fees. Id.
The use of gloves, gowns, masks, and eyewear all directly affect the dental office supplies
budget regardless of whether the dentist uses the procedures with some or all the patients. Id. Costs
for dental supplies account for 10% to 12% of a practice's total average expense. Id. Over the past
few years, the supplies expense per patient visit has increased from six dollars per visit to about
$12.50 per visit, an increase of about 108%. Id. To compensate, gross billings have increased
10.5% each year since 1986. Id. Dentists adopting recommended barrier techniques incur higher
supply expenses per patient visit than dentists who have not complied with the procedures or who
use them only with some patients. Id. The use of barrier techniques has also boosted the time
dentists devote to each patient-donning gloves, masks, gowns, and protective eyewear, and properly
disposing of the items after use takes time. Id. As a result, heavy users of these techniques see
roughly 410 fewer patients each year. Id. This also increases the operating costs for the office.
Id. It is important to note that these figures do not include the cost and time factors for updating
sterilization equipment such as autoclaves, stocking sterilization materials such as plastic film and
alcohol, training costs for personnel, or renovating office space to accommodate the changes.
However, Dr. Trusten Lee, D.D.S., states that total compliance with the sterilization
regulations can be achieved with a cost of approximately $10 per patient visit. Interview with Dr.
Trusten Lee, D.D.S., Lakeland Dental Center, in Merrillville, Indiana (Nov. 23, 1993). These
figures suggest that the overall cost of compliance is not as cumbersome as some dentists believe.
Furthermore, Dr. Lee estimates that dentists who treat approximately 20 patients per day will
average one seropositive patient every seven days. Id. The striking point here is that the
overwhelming majority of these seropositive patients will not disclose their condition to the dentist.
Id. Thus, the dentists must rely on their sterilization procedures, which Dr. Lee states are far from
adequate in some cases. Id.
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These authorities need to work together to outline and implement the best
possible disease management plan. To do this, each body needs to understand
the role and position of the other. Each must realize its dependence upon the
other to achieve their mutual goals. The legislature has the authority to
transform disease control guidelines into law, thus increasing the weight and
implementation power of the requirements. The legislature has the authority and
support of the entire federal system behind it. However, Congress frequently
does not have the thorough knowledge needed to create medically sound and
logistically feasible laws. Congress needs the national and state dental
associations to assist in drafting the laws and to help in policing and enforcing
them once they are enacted. The dental associations govern ethical standards for
the industry and conduct disciplinary proceedings for inappropriate behavior by
dentists. Furthermore, the associations have the primary responsibility of
organizing and overseeing education for both dentists and patients. Finally,
many standards of care used in civil malpractice cases are derived from the
guidelines provided by the dental associations. However, before the dental
associations will cooperate, they must be assured the legislature is listening to
their concerns and acting in their interests. Dentists want legislation tailored to
and specifically addressing the special needs and risks present in the dental
setting.
IV. THE RIGHT

OF PRIVACY

A concern that has plagued attempts to curtail the general spread of HIV
is the outcry by carriers that proposed measures do little to protect their personal
and medical privacy rights and, in fact, cause unjustifiable breaches of these
rights." More specifically, the most important issue to most carriers in
effective policymaking is the urgent need to protect confidential information
shared with their health care providers. Thus, before any legislation can be
proposed specifically to handle HIV and dentistry, the general issues of how to
protect these privacy rights of carriers and of how the judiciary should approach
any legislation infringing upon these rights must be addressed. This Section will
briefly trace the development of the right of privacy and the standards courts
have used to review infringements upon various aspects of the privacy right.
This Section will then analyze the level of scrutiny a court would use to review
a piece of legislation created to control the spread of HIV in dental settings.

3 ROSCOE POUND,
86. An invasion of privacy is an injury to one's personality.
JURISPRUDENCE 58 (1959). It impairs the mental peace and comfort of the individual and may
produce suffering much greater than that produced by a bodily injury. Id.; see John W. Wade, The
Communicative Torts and the First Amendment, 48 Miss. L.J 671 (1977).
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A right of privacy has been heralded in the American political tradition,"
even though the Constitution itself does not mention such a right. Without a
specific constitutional reference, the privacy right's very nature and scope are
unclear.'
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a right of
personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain zones of privacy," does exist under
the protections offered by the ConstitutionY' The Court has recognized that
the Constitution enables a certain private sphere of individual liberty to be kept
largely beyond the reach of government.91 In varying contexts, the Court or
individual justices have found at least the roots of that right in the First
Amendment, 92 the Fourth and Fifth Amendments," 3 the penumbras of the Bill

87. Privacy is commonly understood as a value asserted by individuals against the demands of
a curious and intrusive society. See generallyTHOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 549 (1970); RICHARD F. HIxSON, PRIVACY IN A PUBLIC SOCIETY: HUMAN RIGHTS
IN CONFLICT (1987); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (M. Wamock ed., 1962) (1859); ALAN F.
WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); Steven I. Andre, Privacy As an Aspect of the First
Amendment: The Placeof Privacy ina Society Dedicated to IndividualLiberty, 20 U. WEST. L.A.
L. REV. 87 (1988-89); Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer
to Dean Prosser,39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964); J. Braxton Craven, Jr., Personhood: The Right
to Be Let Alone, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699, 701-02; Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM.
L. REV. 1410, 1428-29 (1974); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy,
4 HARV. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
88. The concept of privacy has, of course, psychological, social, and political dimensions that
reach far beyond its analysis in a legal context. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN
CONDITION, (1958); ERIC HOFFER, THE TRUE BELIEVER: THOUGHTS ON THE NATURE OF MASS
MOVEMENTS (1951); GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR: A NOVEL (1949); George J.
Stigler, An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1980).
However, these dimensions will only be dealt with incidentally in this note. Furthermore, this note
will not present a detailed exposition on the case law and statutes developing the right of privacy.
Rather, the aim is more limited to briefly surveying the right of privacy and its development so that
the reader may better understand how privacy profoundly affects the management of HIV.
89. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (articulating various "zones of
privacy").
90. For discussions concerning the early development of the right of privacy, see Wilfred
Feinberg, Recent Developments in the Law of Privacy, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 713 (1948); Leon
Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REV. 237 (1932); Rufus Lisle, The Right of Privacy (A
Contra Vew), 19 KY. LJ. 137 (1931); Louis Nizer, The Right of Privacy: A Half Century's
Developments, 39 MICH. L. REV. 526 (1941); Denis O'Brien, The Right of Privacy, 2 COLUM. L.
REV. 437 (1902); Leon R. Yankwich, The Right of Privacy: Its Development, Scope, and
Limitations, 27 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 499 (1952); R.T. Kimbrough, Annotation, Right ofPrivacy,
138 A.L.R. 22 (1942); R.T. Kimbrough, Annotation, Right of Privacy, 168 A.L.R. 446 (1947);
W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Right of Privacy, 14 A.L.R.2d 750 (1950).
91. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747 (1986) (holding that a state's law subordinating women's privacy right to abortion was
unconstitutional).
92. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). In Stanley, the Supreme Court held that, despite
the government's valid interest in eliminating obscenity, criminal prosecution for private possession
of obscene material in the home constituted too drastic an invasion of the "right to be free from state
inquiry into the contents of [one's] library." Id. at 565. After discussing the fundamental First
Amendment right to receive information and ideas, the Court said: "For also fundamental is the
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of Rights,' the Ninth Amendment," and the first sections of the Fourteenth
Amendment." These justices make it clear that only personal rights that can
be deemed fundamental or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" are
included in this guarantee of personal privacy.Y They also make it clear that
the right extends to some degree to activities relating to individual autonomy
regarding child rearing," education,' familial relations," ® pro-creation,'

right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into
one's privacy." Id. at 564. Stanley protected nondisclosure of use, not use itself. Id. at 564; see
Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MicH. L. REv. 971, 1291 (1975)
(analyzing Stanley as a nondisclosural privacy case).
93. See generallyTerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967).
94. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating a statute making use of
contraceptives by married couples illegal because it deprived couples of the liberty protected by the
fundamental right of privacy). See generally Paul G. Kauper, Penumbras,Peripheries,Emanations,
Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 235, 253
(1965).
95. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
96. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (rejecting the prohibition of teaching in
languages other than English and teaching of languages other than English below the eighth grade
as unconstitutional because it deprived teachers and parents of their liberty interest without due
process of law); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a prohibition on abortion violated
the Due Process Clause as an unjustified deprivation of liberty because it unnecessarily infringed on
women's right of privacy).
97. The Court's use of the term "privacy" often differs substantially from the common
definition of the term. In many instances, a more descriptive term might be the right to "personal
autonomy." See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (recognizing the right of persons under the age of 16 to choose
whether to use contraceptives); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (invalidating
the requirement of spousal or parental consent to obtain abortions); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (holding that a prohibition on abortion violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as an unjustified deprivation of liberty because it unnecessarily infringed upon women's
fundamental right of privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (expanding the right to
access of contraceptives to single people because the fundamental right of privacy exists in the
individual and not in the marital relationship); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating a statute making the use of contraceptives by
married couples illegal because it deprived couples of the liberty protected by the fundamental right
of privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down a statute allowing the
sterilization of people convicted of two or more felonies and establishing that marriage and
procreation are liberties with special constitutional significance).
98. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (holding that a state cannot force the breakup
of a natural family over the objection of the parents and their children, for the sole reason that to
do so was thought to be in the children's best interests, without some showing of unfitness, because
the Due Process Clause would clearly be violated); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(holding that only those interests of the highest order, and those not otherwise served, can
overbalance the legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion and to the power of parents to make
such decisions for their children); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that
an act requiring attendance at public schools for all normal children between the ages of eight and
16 violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it deprived the parental liberty interest in the
upbringing and education of their children).
See generally JOHN E. NoWAM ST AL.,

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1994

322

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 1 [1994], Art. 5

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

marriage, 102 contraception," °3 and abortion."4

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 635 (3d ed. 1986); Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unaminity and Desegregation:
Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958,68 GEo. L.J. 1 (1979); Richard A. Posner, The
UncertainProtection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. Cr. REV. 173, 195-96.
99. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See also supra note 96.
100. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (holding that a father does not have
a constitutionally protected fundamental liberty interest in his relationship with a child conceived by
him with another man's wife); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977) (holding that reasonable
regulations that do not significantly interfere with the decision to enter into the marital relationship
may legitimately be imposed); Belle Terre v..Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (holding that unrelated
people have no fundamental right to live together); Stanley v. illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (striking
a state's irrebuttable statutory presumption that all unmarried fathers are unqualified to raise their
children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (stating that the custody, care, and
nurturing of the child resides first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include the
preparation for obligations that the state can neither supply nor hinder); Moore v. East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977) (striking a zoning ordinance that interfered with families' liberty and privacy
interests, including the right to live with whom they chose). See generally John H. Garvey,
Children and the Idea of Liberty: A Comment on the Civil Commitment Cases, 68 KY. L.J. 809,
832-833 (1979-1980).
101. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down a statute allowing for the
sterilization of some persons convicted of two felonies and establishing the right to marriage and
procreation as those of special constitutional significance).
102. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that miscegenation statutes, adopted
to prevent marriages between persons on the basis of racial classification, violate the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).
103. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
104. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (holding that a state may prohibit the use of public resources
to promote or perform abortions and may require physicians to test for viability); Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (holding that states may not enact statutes
discouraging women from choosing abortions under the pretext of maternal health); Akron v. Akron
Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (striking five provisions of an ordinance
regulating abortions); Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (invalidating a secondtrimester hospitalization requirement but upholding a requirement that a second physician be present
during abortions performed after viability); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding a
statute requiring physicians to notify parents if their minor seeks an abortion); Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S.'297 (1980) (determining that Title X does not obligate a state to pay for medically necessary
abortions for which Congress has withheld federal funding); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)
(striking down a statute requiring that either parental or judicial consent be obtained for abortions
by women under age 18); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding a state's reimbursement
of childbirth and medically necessary abortion expenses through Medicare even though the state did
not provide such funds for abortions); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 5 (1990); FRED
W. FRIENDLY & MARTHA J.H. ELLIOTT, THE CONSTITUTION: THAT DELICATE BALANCE 202-04
(1984); David A.J. Richards, ConstitutionalPrivacy, Religious Disestablishment, and the Abortion
Decisions, in ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 148, 171-73 (Jay L. Garfield &
Patricia Hennessey eds., 1984); ARCHIBALD Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 113-14 (1976); Susan Estrich & Kathleen Sullivan, Abortion Politics:
Writingfor anAudience of One, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 119, 125-127 (1989) (commenting that privacy

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol29/iss1/5

Lawyer: HIV and Dentistry

1994]

HIV AND DENTISTRY

323

When a fundamental right is at stake, the Court has applied a strict scrutiny
standard and has held that regulation limiting or infringing upon these rights may
be justified only by a compelling state interest and that the legislation must be
narrowly tailored to protect that compelling state interest.I10 When a nonfundamental right is at stake, the Court has applied the far less stringent
standards of a balancing test"te or a mere rationality test, under which a law
will be upheld if it is rationally related to any conceivable legitimate end of
government.t

07

The Supreme Court has mentioned another aspect of the constitutional right
of privacy: the right of informational privacy or, alternatively stated, the right
In several instances, the Court has
of nondisclosure of personal matter."

cases rest centrally on the moral fact that a person belongs to oneself, not to others or to society as
a whole); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v.
Wade, 63 N.C. L. REv. 375 (1985); John T. Noonan, Jr., The Root and Branch of Roe v. Wade,
63 NEB. L. REV. 668 (1984); Thomas I. Emerson, The Power of Congress to Change Constitutional
Decisionsof the Supreme Court; The Human Life Bill, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 129, 131 (1982); Donald
H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1639 (1979); Michael J. Perry,
Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due
Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689, 705-06 (1976); R.A. Epstein, Substantive Due Process by any
Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SuP. CT. REV. 159, 170-72; Philip B. Heymann& Douglas
E. Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U. L. REv. 765, 773-74

(1973).
105. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
106. See infra notes 172-190 and accompanying text.
107. The significance of the Court's decision to classify a particular right as fundamental or
non-fundamental is even greater than might at first be supposed. Where the right is not found to
be fundamental and that a legitimate state objective and a rational relation between the means chosen
and that objective are all that is required, the Court's deference to the legislative judgment is so
extreme that there is virtually no scrutiny at all. See generally J. Braxon Craven, Jr., Personhood:
The Right to Be Let Alone, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699, 700-01. For instance, no statute in the area of
economic legislation has been invalidated on substantive due process grounds for over 40 years. By
contrast, if the right is found to be fundamental, the scrutiny is so strict that few statutes impairing
the right can meet the test of showing that the state's objective is "compelling" and that it cannot
be achieved in a less burdensome way. Id. Thus, the Court's decision on "fundamentalness" tends
to be virtually dispositive of whether the statute is upheld or invalidated.
108. See, e.g., Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979) (upholding the right to
privacy for psychological testing results); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (upholding a
statute requiring that official drug prescription forms identifying a patient's name be filed with the
state health department). Nondisclosure of personal information is an essential element of individual
privacy. See ARTHURR. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 25 (1971) (discussing privacy as an
"individual's ability to control the circulation of information relating to him"); Hyman Gross, The
Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 34, 37 (1967) (discussing the ability to mandate the
nondisclosure of personal information about oneself as privacy in its "primary or strong sense").
"Information preserves, like spatial territories, provide a normative framework for the development
of individual personality." Robert C. Post, The Social Foundationsof Privacy: Community and Self
in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957 (1989). Just as we feel violated when our
bedrooms are invaded, so too we experience the inappropriate disclosure of private information "as
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used the right of privacy to protect the release of private information. 1° Prior
pollutions or defilements."
Ferdinand Schoeman, Privacy and Intimate Information, in
PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 403, 406 (Ferdinand D. Schoeman ed.,

1984).
Professor Westin, author of Privacy and Freedom, defines privacy as the right of individuals,
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent, information about
them is communicated to others. See WESTIN, supra note 87, at 7. Professor Westin identifies four
reasons why the right to privacy is essential. Id. at 32. First, it preserves the personal autonomy
that is essential to the development of the individual's "sacred individuality." Id. at 33-34. In
addition, privacy facilitates emotional release from the pressures of daily life, especially during
periods of loss, shock, or sorrow. Id. at 34-36. Moreover, it makes possible self-evaluation,
including the exercise of conscience. Id. at 36-37. Finally, privacy enables individuals to engage
in limited, reserved, and protected communications. Id. at 37-39. This in turn gives the individual
the ability to share confidences and yet maintain a necessary mental distance in interpersonal
relationships. Id.
Professor Krattenmaker, who also defines privacy as the individual's control over
communication about himself, explains:
Privacy permits people th share intimacies and ideas upon their own terms, and thus to
establish those mutual reciprocal relinquishments of the self that underlie the relations
of love, friendship, and trust. Without a reserve of privacy, we would have nothing to
share and, hence, nothing to build upon in our human relationships save fear, mistrust,
and combativeness. The ability to shield ourselves from public view permits the
exchange of intimate confidences necessary to establish a secure love or trust. The right
to privacy thus is an inseparable aspect of our humanity.
Thomas G. Krattenmaker, InterpersonalTestimonialPrivileges Underthe FederalRvles ofEvidence:
A Suggested Approach, 64 GEO. L.J. 613, 651 (1976).
Ruth Gavison has defined privacy as a gradient that varies in three dimensions: secrecy,
anonymity, and solitude. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 425-40
(1980). She believes that an individual's loss of privacy can be objectively measured "as others
obtain information" about him, "pay attention to him, or gain access to him." Id. at 428. Robert
Merton rests his claim that privacy "is an important functional requirement for the effective
operation of social structure" on the neutral definition of privacy as "insulation from observability."
ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 429 (1968). Privacy is necessary
because without it "the pressure to live up to the details of all (and often conflicting) social norms
would become literally unbearable; in a complex society, schizophrenic behavior would become the
rle rather than the formidable exception it already is." Id.
109. For an analysis of several cases, see Bruce E. Falby, A ConstitusionalRight to Avoid
Disclosure of PersonalMauer: Perfecting the PrivacyAnalysis in J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080
(6th Cir. 1981), 71 GEo. LJ. 219 (1982). The common law also provides protection against the
unauthorized release of private and personal information. For a general discussion, see WILIAM
L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEErON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 784 (5th ed. 1984);
Jack Hirshleifer, Privacy: Its Origin, Function, and Future, 9 J.LEGAL STuD. 649 (1980); Richard
A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1978); Post, supra note 108. As
commentators on tort law have pointed out, "the law protects emotional tranquility and personal
dignity ....
" RICHARD A. EPSTEIN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1034 (4th ed.
1984). See also William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). One way tort law
protects these interests is by imposing liability for the disclosure of private facts. To satisfy a prima
facie case, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant released the private information, that the
defendant intended to release the information, and that the private facts released were highly
offensive to him and would be highly offensive to an average reasonable person. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1976).
Additionally, the plaintiff must prove both actual and
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to Whalen v. Roe"' in 1977, however, the Court did not explicitly distinguish
between autonomy"' and nondisclosure," 2 but referred only to a general
right to privacy."' In Whalen, the Court attempted to clarify its privacy
analysis.
Whalen addressed the constitutionality of a New York statute, provisions
of which required the New York Public Health Commissioner to obtain from
physicians the names and addresses of all persons who had received certain
"Schedule II" medications" 4 for which there were both legal and illegal
markets.' 5 In addition, the provisions required the Commissioner to record
this information on a centralized computer file." 6 The appellees, users of the
medications, alleged that the statutory provisions violated their constitutional
right of privacy." 7 The district court agreed, concluding that doctor-patient
privacy is constitutionally protected and can be regulated only if there is a
compelling state interest and a statute narrowly tailored to promote that
interest." s The district court conceded that the statute promoted a compelling
state interest," 9 but found that the patient identification requirements were not

proximate cause. Id. The plaintiff is not required to plead and prove special damages. Id.
110. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
111. This branch of the right of is concerned with freedom from government interference in
decisionmaking. See supra note 100. Traditionally, courts have recognized only rights falling
within the autonomy branch as fundamental. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
112. This branch protects private information from unwarranted disclosure. See generally
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Falby, supra note 109.
113. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (discussing the right of privacy);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (discussing the right of privacy); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (discussing the right to be free from unwanted governmental intrusions);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485 (1965) (discussing the right of privacy). See also Note,
Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have a Principle?, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1974). The note
contends that the Court in Griswold actually protected the disclosure of contraceptive use by married
couples, not the use itself, inasmuch as it approved state regulation of contraceptives by less
intrusive means. Id. at 1163. The note also states that in Roe v. Wade, however, the Court clearly
protected the right of a woman to decide privately whether to bear a child. Id.
114. Schedule I medications included opium and opium derivatives, cocaine, methadone,
amphetamines, and methaqualone. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 593.
115. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 591-92 (1977). The statute's purpose was to allow
authorities to monitor the use of drugs and prevent their abuse. Id.
116. Id. at 591.
117. Id. at 600.
118. Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931, 936-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd sub nom. Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
119. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. at 937. Although the court stated that the statute promoted a
"legitimate" state interest, the court's formulation of its standard of review indicates that it meant
"compelling." Id.
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narrowly tailored because they were not necessary to promote that interest.'"
and enjoined
The court therefore held that the law was unconstitutional
2
enforcement of the patient identification requirements.1 1
On direct appeal," the Supreme Court rejected the district court's
holding. n3 The Court held that there was nothing unreasonable in the
legislature's assumption that the patient-identification requirement might aid in
the enforcement of laws designed to minimize the misuse of dangerous
drugs.' 2" The district court's failure to find a necessity for the patient
identification-requirement was not a sufficient reason to hold the requirement
unconstitutional. 125
The Court then addressed the appellees' claim that the statute violated their
right to privacy."
In doing so, the Court apparently recognized a right to
nondisclosure of personal matters." 2 The Court cited its opinions in Griswold

120. Id. at 937. The district court based this conclusion on the following facts. An existing
state prescription form program provided for the issuance of serially numbered prescription forms
to physicians. In addition, doctors prescribing and pharmacists dispensing Schedule H drugs were
given a Drug Enforcement Administration number. Consequently, the state could promptly
determine the quantity of drugs prescribed and dispensed by particular physicians and pharmacists.
Thus, over-prescription and over-dispensation, thefts, and forgeries could be detected. Given this
scheme, the district court concluded that the patient identification requirement added nothing to the
state's effort to control the abuse of Schedule U drugs. Id.
121. Id. at 938. The district court's decision is an illustration of strict scrutiny, the heightened
scrutiny courts give statutes that impinge on some liberties protected by the Due Process Clause.
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
122. Jurisdiction was conferred on the Supreme Court by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 2101(b) (1970).
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 591 (1977). Section 1253 provided that any party may appeal
directly to the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying injunctive relief in a suit required
to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970). Section
2101 set forth the procedural requirements for a direct appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2101 (1970).
123. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603-04.
124. Id. at 597-98. In effect, the Supreme Court applied the rational relation test, the
deferential standard of review applied to regulations that do not infringe upon specially protected
aspects of liberty. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. The Court never discussed the
applicability of a higher standard of review because, as the rest of the opinion indicates, the Court
failed to find a constitutional violation of a liberty interest specially protected by the Due Process
Clause. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-606 (reasoning that the statute did not constitutionally violate

the privacy interest in the nondisclosure of personal matters or autonomous decisionmaking).
125. Wha/en, 429 U.S. at 598.
126. Id. at 598-606.
127. The Court stated:
The cases sometimes characterized as protecting "privacy" have in fact involved at least

two different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions. Appellees argue that both of these interests are impaired by this

statute.

The mere existence in a readily available form of the information about

patients' use of Schedule II drugs creates a genuine concern that the information will
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v. Connecticut'2 and Stanley v. Georgia'" in support of the proposition that
the right to privacy includes the right of nondisclosure of personal matters." 3
The Court also cited with approval' an article by Professor Philip Kurland
which identifies one facet of constitutional privacy as the right of an individual
32
not to have private affairs made public by the government.
The Whalen Court held, however, that the New York program did not on
its face pose a sufficiently grievous threat to the privacy interest to establish a
constitutional violation.133 The Court reasoned that the statutory safeguards
to prevent dissemination of the potentially damaging information to the public
adequately protected the individual's interest in nondisclosure." The Court
further concluded that disclosure by the patients to the state was an essential part
of modem medical practice and thus not an impermissible invasion of
privacy. 35

become publicly known and that it will adversely affect their reputations. This concern
makes some patients reluctant to use, and some doctors reluctant to prescribe, such
drugs .... Thus, the statute threatens to impair both their interest in the nondisclosure
of private information and also their interest in making important decisions
independently.
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977).
128. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (upholding the constitutional right to marital privacy).
129. 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (upholding the constitutional right "to be free from state inquiry
into the contents of [one's] library").
130. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599.
131. Id. at 600 n.24.
132. Philip B. Kurland, The Private I, U. CHI. MAO., Autumn 1976, at 8. The Court quoted
the following passage from the article:
There are at least three facets [of a constitutional right of privacy] that have been
partially revealed, but their form and shape remain to be fully ascertained. The first is
the right of the individual to be free in his private affairs from governmental surveillance
and intrusion. The second is the right of an individual not to have his private affairs
made public by the government. The third is the right of an individual to be free in
action, thought, experience, and belief from governmental compulsion.
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 n.24 (1977) (quoting Kurland, supra, at 8). The Court stated
that the first facet Kurland describes is directly protected by the Fourth Amendment, while the
second and third correspond to the liberty interest in the nondisclosure of personal matters and the
liberty interest in making autonomous decisions. Id.
133. WMalen, 429 U.S. at 600.
134. Id. at 600-02. The Court also reasoned that because the state did not entirely prohibit the
use of Schedule 1 drugs nor condition access to them on the consent of a third party, the individual
was not deprived of the right to decide, with the advice of a physician, to use the medication. Id.
at 603.
135. Id. at 594-600. The Court also noted that the disclosure to the New York Department of
Health was neither significantly different from the disclosure required under prior New York law,
nor was it "meaningfully distinguishable from a host of other unpleasant invasions of privacy that
are associated with many facets of health care." Id. at 602. The Court cited examples of statutory
reporting requirements related to venereal disease and child abuse. Id. at 602 n.29. In addition,
the Court cited Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, a case that upheld a section of a statute that
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Anomalously, the Court concluded its opinion'" by appearing to
eviscerate its prior recognition of a right to nondisclosure. 37 The Court noted
that the government's duty to keep information private was only arguably
constitutional" and that the Court did not decide any constitutional questions
which might be presented by unwarranted disclosure of information in
government computer banks.

39

The Court thus took away with one hand what

it had given with the other."
In fact, it is difficult to determine if Whalen recognized a constitutional
right of nondisclosure of personal matter.' 4' Although the Court initially
determined that the right to privacy includes a right to nondisclosure of personal
matter, it disclaimed any such determination in the concluding portion of its

opinion.

2

Thus, the split in the federal courts over the proper interpretation

of Whalen is not surprising. The majority of federal courts, including the Fifth

imposed reporting requirements on health facilities and physicians that perform abortions. Id.
136. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605.
137. A strict scrutiny standard of review did not need to be applied because the Court refused
to explicitly recognize informational privacy as a fundamental right. Instead, the Court applied a
lesser standard and balanced the state's interest in the information against the risk of harm caused
by disclosure. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-604 (1977).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 605-06.
140. Justice Brennan wrote separately to clarify the Court's meaning. Whalen, 429 U.S. at
606-07 (Brennan, J., concurring). He explained:
The Court recognize[s] that an individual's "interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters" is an aspect of the right of privacy . . . but holds that in this case, any such
interest has not been seriously enough invaded by the State to require a showing that its
program was indispensable to the State's effort to control drug abuse.
Id. at 606 (citing to majority opinion).
141. The thrust of the Whalen opinion as a whole, and the Supreme Court's previous and
subsequent nondisclosural privacy decisions, support the interpretation that Wha/en recognized a
right to nondisclosure of personal matters. Even if Whalen only assumed for the purpose of analysis
that the right to nondisclosure exists, but then considered it unnecessary to decide whether the right
had not been violated, Whalen at the very least demonstrated the Court's willingness to recognize
the right if presented with facts that show that the right was violated. The Whalen Court, evincing
sensitivity to the need for nondisclosural privacy protection, revealed this willingness when it stated:
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts
of personal information in computerized data banks or other massive government files.
The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare and social security benefits, the
supervision of public health, the direction of our Armed Forces, and the enforcement
of the criminal laws all require the orderly preservation of great quantities of
information, much of which is personal in character and potentially embarrassing or
harmful if disclosed.
Id. at 605. In addition, Whalen indicated that the right to nondisclosure is a limited right. The
Court's concern about the possible dissemination of information "personal in character and
potentially embarrassing or harmful if disclosed" suggests that only personal matters meeting this
definition, rather than all matters arguably personal, are protected by nondisclosural privacy. Id.
142. Id. at 605-06.
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and Third Circuits, interpret Whalen as recognizing a constitutional right to
nondisclosure."' 4 These courts, however, merely recite the Whalen Court's
language about an interest in avoiding nondisclosure of personal matters and
make no attempt to reconcile this language with the opinion's concluding
disclaimer.'" In contrast, the few courts that hold that the Whalen Court did
not recognize a constitutional right to nondisclosure of personal matter rely on
the disclaimer. '
The next major Supreme Court case addressing the issue of informational
privacy was Nixon v. Administrator of General Services."" In Nixon, the
Court rejected the former President's claim that an act of Congress directing the
General Services Administrator to take custody of Nixon's tapes and papers
violated Nixon's constitutional privacy rights. 47
In the course of its
discussion of Nixon's claim, the Court repeated the nondisclosure language from
Whalen, stating that one element of privacy has been characterized as "the
143. See Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1127-28, 1132 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that
Whalen recognized the right to avoid the disclosure of personal matters); McKenna v. Peekskill
Housing Auth., 497 F. Supp. 1217, 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (stating that Whalen identified
nondisclosure as major element of constitutionally protected privacy), modified on othergrounds,
647 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1981); Doe v. United States Civil Serv. Comin'n, 483 F. Supp. 539, 566
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (stating that the declared zone of privacy declared in Whalen and safeguarded by
the Constitution embraces the individual interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal matters);
Hawaii Psychiatric Soc'y, Dist. Branch v. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028, 1043 (D. Haw. 1979)
(stating that Whalen identified the right to nondisclosure but not the applicable standard of review);
Service Mach. & Shipbuilding Corp. v. Edwards, 466 F. Supp. 1200, 1203 (W.D. La. 1979)
(stating that Whalen recognized that plaintiffs had valid privacy interests at stake); McKenna v.
Fargo, 451 F. Supp. 1355, 1379 (D.N.J. 1978) (stating that Whalen recognized the constitutional
right to informational privacy), aff'd without opinion, 601 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1979).
144. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980); Plante v.
Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1127-28, 1132 (5th Cir. 1978); McKenna v. Peekskill Hous. Auth., 497
F. Supp. 1217, 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), modified on othergrounds, 647 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1981);
Doe v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 483 F. Supp. 539, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Hawaii
Psychiatric Soc'y, Dist. Branch v. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028, 1043 (D. Haw. 1979); Service
Mach. & Shipbuilding Corp. v. Edwards, 466 F. Supp. 1200, 1203 (W.D. La. 1979), rev'd on
other grounds, 617 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1980), affd without opinion, 449 U.S. 913 (1980); McKenna
v. Fargo, 451 F. Supp. 1355, 1380 (D.N.J. 1978), afid without opinion, 601 F.2d 575 (3d Cir.
1979).
145. J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981); Crain v. Krehbiel, 443 F. Supp. 202, 209
(N.D. Cal. 1977).
146. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
147. Id. at 457. The Presidential Recording and Materials Preservation Act directed the
General Services Administrator to take custody of Nixon's papers and tapes, separate private from
public portions, and return the private portions. Note following 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1975).
The most sensitive materials were those relating to "his wife, his daughters, his physician, lawyer,
and clergyman, and his close friends, as well as personal diary dictablets and his wife's personal
files." Aixon, 433 U.S. at 459.
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The Nixon
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.""
Court concluded that, although the former President had a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the documents, protective provisions of the Act and an overriding
public interest in the documents militated against holding the Act
unconstitutional. 49 The Court used a balancing 'standard to weigh Nixon's
privacy interests against the public's interest in the documents, instead of the
strict scrutiny standard that is used when recognized fundamental rights are

implicated, 1s0

Although the protection of personal privacy" has largely evolved in the
last hundred years, 52 privacy of medical information has always been
recognized as essential to the practice of medicine. 53 In the landmark case
United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation," the Third Circuit held
that constitutional protection of privacy extends in part to medical records and
medical information even though the court refrained from terming it a
fundamental right. 55 The court stated that medical records, which may

148. ArNon, 433 U.S. at 457 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)). The Mrion Court
cited Whalen apparently to establish that the former President had a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the tapes and records and that he was entitled to fourth amendment protection. Id.
149. Id. at 458. The Court upheld the Act as reasonable, citing cases, including Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), that discuss the fourth
amendment balancing test. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 458.
150. See supra text accompanying note 105.
151. Areas possibly falling within the right to privacy have grown dramatically in recent years,
along with the ability of technology to store, disseminate, and use personal data. See, e.g.,
COMMISSION ON FEDERAL PAPERWORK, CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVACY (1977); U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS,

RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CrIZENS

(1973); A. WESTIN, COMPUTERS, HEALTH RECORDS AND CITIZEN RIGHTS (National Bureau of
Standards, Monograph No. 157, 1976); MYRON BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS (1964);
SAMUEL DASH ET AL., THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959); MARTIN L. GROSS, THE BRAIN WATCHERS

(1962).
152. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 87. Prosser mentioned the Warren and Brandeis
article in his discussion of the right of privacy, noting that "[t]he recognition and development of
the so-called 'right of privacy,' is perhaps the outstanding illustration of the influence of legal
periodicals upon the courts." WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at
802 (4th ed. 1971).
153. For an overview of privacy of medical records and the physician-patient privilege, see
Robert M. Gellman, Prescribing Privacy: The Uncertain Role ofthe Physician in the Protection of
Patient Privacy, 62 N.C. L. REv. 255 (1984).
154. 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
155. Id. at 577 (holding that employee medical records clearly fall within the zone of privacy
protection). See also In re Search Warrant (Sealed), 810 F.2d 67, 71 (3d Cir.) (stating that medical
records clearly are within the constitutional sphere of the right to privacy), cert. denied, 483 U.S.
1007 (1987); Carter v. Broadlawns Medical Ctr., 667 F. Supp. 1269, 1282 (S.D. Iowa 1987),
modified on other grounds, 857 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1988) (extending the right to privacy to patient
records held by a county hospital), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1096 (1989); Shoemaker v. Handel, 608
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contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within the ambit of material
entitled to privacy protection.I" "Information about one's body and state of
health is a matter which the individual is ordinarily entitled to retain within the
'private enclave where the individual may lead a private life.' ""' The court

F. Supp. 1151, 1159 (D.N.J. 1985) (holding that the right to privacy does extend to avoiding
disclosure of "personal medical information," but must be weighed against competing state interest),
aff'd, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986); Trade Waste Management Ass'n v. Hughey, 780 F.2d 221,
234 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating that personal medical history is protected from random governmental
intrusion).
156. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 577.
157. Id. (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank,
J., dissenting), rev'd 353 U.S. 391 (1957)). "The amount of medical information about patients that
is routinely recorded [has] increased tremendously in recent decades." Gellman, supra note 153,
at 257. "[A] hospital record may contain considerable amounts of non-medical data, including
information about a patient's relatives, financial status, education, employment history, lifestyle,
and any other aspect of a patient's life that is deemed to be relevant to treatment or research." Id.
at 258. "Patients have become used to the routine disclosure of medical information" because of
the surge of insurance and government requirements for reimbursement of medical expenses. Id.
at 261. Although these disclosures are considered to be with the consent of the patients, the patients
must provide the information to receive the aid. Id.
Therefore, the patients have no real
alternative.
"Third party payors [primarily consisting of insurance carriers] require an extensive amount
of information to support payment of a claim." Id. at 260; see also Privacy of Medical Records:
Hearings on H.R. 2979 and 3444 Before a Subcomm. on the Comm. on Government Operations
House ofRepresentatives, 96th Cong., Ist Seas. 553-76 (1979) (statement of Marshall R. Crawford,
Senior Director, Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association) [hereinafter Privacy Hearing]. According
to the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, the information disclosed must be sufficient to
establish that services billed were included under the benefit agreements, necessary and warranted,
and actually delivered. Information needed includes identity of the patient, identity of the physician,
identity of the facility, diagnosis, treatment description, length of stay, and billed charges. In
addition, when Blue Cross serves as an intermediary for government programs, other items of
personal information may be necessary to satisfy the program requirements. Gellman, supra note
153, at 260.
"Increased government spending for health care has further increased the required number of
disclosures." Id. "With the implementation of Medicare and Medicaid in 1966, the share of the
nation's health bill paid by government increased significantly." Id. "A major consequence of
increased government spending for health care is the growth of government programs to control the
cost and improve the delivery and quality of health care." Id. "These programs, which include
routine audits, medical peer review, and fraud, abuse, and waste investigations, frequently require
access to identifiable patient information to carry out their functions." Id. at 260-61. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 1395(0 (1976) (prohibiting payments to Medicare providers unless they provide the
information necessary to determine the amounts due); 42 U.S.C. § 1320(c). (1976) (establishing
Professional Standards Review Organizations); Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 141-50, 96 Stat. 381-95 (1982) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320, 1395,
1396) (replacing Professional Standards Review Organizations with "utilization and quality control
peer review organizations'); 42 U.S.C. § 3525 (1976) (granting the Inspector General of the
Department of Health and Human Services subpoena power to prevent fraud and abuse in
Department programs). "Thus, in addition to [the] disclosures necessary to justify payment of
claims, government involvement in health care may require additional levels of disclosures to
support oversight and control mechanisms." Gelilman, supra note 153, at 261. "One consequence
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applied the balancing test, noting that governmental intrusion into medical
records is permitted only after a finding that the societal interest in disclosure
outweighs the individual's privacy interest on the specific facts of the case."

Modern circumstances such as the HIV crisis have caused some courts to
revaluate the issue of disclosing medical information. Many courts agree that
the sensitive nature of medical information about HIV makes a compelling
argument for keeping this information confidential. " Society's moral judgments about the high-risk activities associated with the disease, including sexual
relations and drug use, make the information extremely personal."W Thus, the
privacy interest surrounding one's serostatus is even greater than one's privacy
interest in ordinary medical records because of the social stigma attached to the
disease. 16
Because the potential for harm resulting from nonconsensual disclosure is
substantial," some courts have expanded traditional notions of the fundamental right of privacy and have applied strict scrutiny to the infringement of
informational privacy."' For example, in Faison v. Parker,'" a district

is that both physicians and patients have become used to the routine disclosure of medical
information that was previously disclosed, if at all, only on rare occasions." Id.
Disease control measures resulting from the onset of communicable diseases were another
major step in allowing greater disclosure of patient information. These measures permitted
information concerning communicable diseases to be released to governmental public health boards
and sometimes to other people without the patients' consent. These measures were driven by the
developing concept of a general duty to society that is of a higher order than the duty to protect a
patient's privacy. Thus, in addition to breaching confidentiality for the sake of third party payors,
breaching it for the sake of society became acceptable.
158. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980). The court
stated that the factors in deciding whether to intrude into an individual's privacy include: (1) the
type of record requested; (2) the information it does or might contain; (3) the potential for harm in
any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure; (4) the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which
the record was generated; (5) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosures; (6)
the degree of need for access; and (7) whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated
public policy, or other recognizable public interest militating toward access. Id. See also Fraternal
Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 110-11 (3d Cir. 1987).
159. See infra note 230.
160. See infra note 231.
161. See ifra notes 230-31. But see Plowman v. U. S. Dep't of Army, 698 F. Supp. 627
(E.D. Va. 1988) (holding that the privacy interest in the nondisclosure of one's HIV status is no
greater than the privacy interest in the nondisclosure of other medical information).
162. See infra note 230.
163. The government must demonstrate a compelling interest in the information, to disclose
matters that are defined as highly personal and sensitive. Generally, the compelling state interest
must be accompanied by adequate safeguards to protect against widespread dissemination of the
information. See, e.g., supra note 105 and accompanying text. See also McKenna v. Fargo, 451
F. Supp. 1355, 1381 (D.NJ. 1978).
164. 823 F. Supp. 1198 (S.D. Pa. 1993).
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court applied a strict scrutiny analysis to an action claiming that a presentence
report revealed the plaintiff's HIV results and other medical information in
violation of her constitutional right of privacy."
The court found that the
state had demonstrated a compelling interest in including private medical and
mental health information of the plaintiff in the presentence report.tnt Further,
the court found that state statutes and rules concerning the confidentiality of
presentence reports adequately safeguarded against disclosure to the general
public. '"

Another case applying strict scrutiny to the disclosure of medical
information is Doe v. Barrington,I which held that disclosure of a person's
exposure to or infection with HIV is a disclosure of a personal matter that falls
within the ambit of a protected privacy interest.t The court in Barrington,
however, also emphasized that "[alan individual's privacy interest in medical
information and records is not absolute." In analyzing a governmentally
imposed deprivation of those privacy interests, "[a] court must determine
whether the societal interest in disclosure and mandatory testing outweighs the
privacy interest involved. "I' Under this rationale, for a legislative proposal
that infringes upon these privacy interests to pass constitutional muster, the
government must show a compelling state interest in breaching a health care
worker's or patient's right to privacy.171

Other courts analyzing IRV disclosure provisions have not gone so far as
to extend fundamental right protection to the release of HIV information and
thus do not apply the strict scrutiny standard. Rather, the courts use a lesser
standard that balances the interests of the state against the privacy interests of
the individual." 2 One such case is Woods v. White, " where a district court

165. Id. at 1201-02.

166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 1202.
Id. at 1203-04.
729 F. Supp. 376 (D.N.J. 1990).
Id. at 385.

170. Id.

(holding that the governmental interest in a police officer's disclosure of a person's

H1V infection to his neighbors did not outweigh the substantial privacy interest of the individual).
In Barrington, a police officer warned a person of her neighbor's infection with HIV. Because her
children attended the same school as the four children of the infected neighbor, she contacted the
media and school officials. Nineteen children were removed from the school by parents fearful of
AIDS transmission among students. The story received local news coverage with at least one report
revealing the family name of the HIV-infected person.
171. Id.at 385.
172. Under this standard, the state would not be forced to present a compelling interest and
would not have to demonstrate that the provision was tailored. This standard is significantly easier
for the state to satisfy, thus significantly greater intrusions into the privacy interests of carriers are
allowed.
173. 689 F. Supp 874 (W.D. Wis. 1988).
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held that prison officials who discussed with nonmedical prison personnel and
with other inmates the fact that the plaintiff had tested positive for IV violated
the inmate's constitutional rights. 4 The court recognized the inmate's privacy
interest in the information and stated that it must balance his right to
confidentiality against the governmental interest in disclosure to define the scope
of the right to privacy in personal information."5 The court noted that
information about one's body and state of health is particularly sensitive and that
such information has traditionally been treated differently from other types of
personal information. 76 Recognizing that HIV is related more closely 'than
other diseases to sexual activity and intravenous drug use, the court stated that
it was difficult to argue that information about this disease was not information
of the most personal kind, or that an individual would not have an interest in
protecting against the dissemination of such information. 1" Acknowledging
that there might be circumstances that would limit plaintiff's right to privacy of
his condition, the court noted that this case did not present such
7
circumstances. 8
Another case that used a balancing standard to review the disclosure of
medical information concerning a person's serostatus is Leckelt v. Board of
Commissioners.'" In Leckelt, a hospital fired a nurse suspected of being
infected with HIV after he failed to comply with hospital policies requiring
health care workers to inform the hospital of any infectious diseases they might
be carrying. The lower court sustained the firing, holding that the hospital's
infection control policy of requiring all nurses who had been voluntarily tested
to divulge their serostatus was rationally related to the legitimate state interests
of protecting patients and health care workers from the spread of infectious
diseases." s "[The hospital's] interest in knowing [Leckelt's] health status far
outweighed the limited intrusion of requiring him to produce the results of a test
he had already taken voluntarily."'

174. Id. at 876.
175. Id.
176. Id. (citing United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577'(3d Cir. 1980)).
177. Woods, 689 F. Supp. at 876.
178. Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1988).
179. 714 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. La. 1989), af'd, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990). Leckelt, a male
nurse, refused to submit to the hospital the results of an AIDS test that he voluntarily undertook
following the admission of his infected roommate to the hospital. Administrators requested results
from the test in accordance with hospital infection control policies. After termination for failure to
comply with this request, Leckelt brought an action against the hospital for violation of § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. The claim of interest to this discussion, however, is his additional assertion of
violations of his Fourth Amendment right to privacy.
180. Leckelt, 714 F. Supp. at 1390-91.
181. Id. at 1392.
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In affirming the lower courts analysis in Leckelt, the Fifth Circuit
emphasized that health care workers have a diminished expectation of
privacy."in Participation in an occupation pervasively regulated to ensure
safety reduces health care workers' privacy rights.'I Hospitals have a strong
interest in protecting the health of employees and patients by preventing the
spread of infectious diseases, and the effectiveness of any infection-control
policies depends upon the health and fitness of the health care workers practicing
in the hospital.'" The court thus concluded that the hospital's strong interest
in maintaining a safe workplace through infection-control policies outweighed
the limited intrusion on Leckelt's privacy interest in the results of his HIV
test. 185,

In re Milton S. Hershey Medical Center"s is another analysis of a
disclosure provision which used a balancing approach.
In Hershey, a
Pennsylvania court addressed whether a hospital may disclose a surgeon's HIVpositive status to a surgical patient who had undergone invasive procedures.
The health care worker sustained a cut through a surgical glove while
performing an invasive procedure, thus exposing the patient to infected blood.
In affirming disclosure, the court emphasized the duty of both the hospital and
the health care worker to provide safe and adequate medical care despite the
slim, but deadly, possibility of HIV transmission." s
The Hershey court
recognized health care workers' right to privacy, but also noted that health care
workers' medical problems are not just their own."in Health care providers'
health conditions "became a public concern the moment [they] picked up a
surgical instrument and became a part of.

.

. invasive procedures. " "'9

The

public's compelling right to be informed about this type of health threat far
outweighed a practicing surgeon's right to keep his HIV status confidential.t"e
To summarize, courts have continued to subject regulations that interfere
with fundamental rights to strict scrutiny.'' A few courts have afforded this

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 909 F.2d 820, 833 (5th Cir. 1990).
Id.
Id.
Id.
595 A.2d 1290 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
Id. at 1295-97.
Id. at 1298.
Id.
In re Milton S. Hershey Medical Cr., 595 A.2d 1290, 1302 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (using a strict scrutiny analysis to reject a

statute requiring court approval for marriage in cases where one of the parties has a child that it is

supporting under court order); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (applying a
strict scrutiny analysis in striking down the prohibition of distributing contraceptives to individuals
under the age of 16).
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protection to informational privacy over medical records containing serostatus
information."
Under this analysis, the courts demand a compelling state
interest in the information and proof that the regulation infringing upon the
privacy right is narrowly tailored to promote that interest.19 In most cases,
states cannot meet this rigorous standard and the regulation fails.
Despite the increased recognition of the right of privacy, however, most
courts have rejected the notion that informational privacy is a fundamental right
and have applied the less stringent balancing test in reviewing legislation
infringing upon an HIV carrier's privacy.'" In these cases, courts have
weighed the utility of the medical information against the possibility and
magnitude of harm to the carrier resulting from its disclosure.'" These courts
have developed the theory that the release of a person's serostatus is sometimes
justified to protect the public health and therefore, will not be completely
protected by the right of privacy. However, because the harms' " caused by
releasing a person's serostatus tend to reflect unfavorably on the character of the
patient, the cases suggest that the balancing test must be carefully applied to
ensure that each right is given proper consideration and is not discounted
prematurely simply because the state has an interest in the information."9
Even under such analysis, statutes allowing limited dissemination of the identity
of HIV carriers and including safeguards against broad and unnecessary release
of such information will likely be affirmed. 1
V. GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST IN PROTECTING
PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE

It is a well-recognized principle that one of the first duties of a state is to
take necessary steps to protect and promote the health of its inhabitants. 199

192. See supra notes 164-71 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 172-90 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 172-90 and accompanying text.
196. These harms may include discrimination in the workplace and in insurance, rejection from
co-workers and friends, and being stereotyped as having a certain lifestyle.
197. The court will not simply decide that disclosure is appropriate just because the state can
show an interest in the information. If the harm caused to the carrier by the disclosure is greater
than the benefit to the state, disclosure will not be allowed. A court will weigh the damage to the
victim heavily in this analysis to ensure that disclosure will not be frivolously permitted. See supra
notes 172-90 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 172-90 and accompanying text.
199. See, e.g., In re Halko, 54 Cal. Rptr. 661, 662-64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966) (holding that the
quarantine and isolation for periods of six months each, "without means of questioning and judicially
determining" the conclusion of the health officer is not an unconstitutional act; also noting that the
legislature -has significant authority in protecting the public's health and that a statute granting
authority to quarantine is not unconstitutional so long as there are "reasonable grounds" for its
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Even when extremely protective measures have been taken by a state, courts
have held the health and safety of citizens to be of the utmost importance.' °
States have passed legislation to combat serious health threats such as
tuberculosis, venereal disease, smallpox, bubonic plague, scarlet fever, and
leprosy."' According to the case law arising from such legislation, the harm
of quarantine, forced vaccinations, or other measures taken to curb the spread
of these diseases was often outweighed by the lifesaving benefits.'
These
early decisions firmly established public health as a legitimate and important
state interest. However, courts today must use these dated precedents carefully
to review protective measures taken to curb the spread of HIV because of
medical advances and progress in the way courts evaluate civil rights
infringements. 2
Early twentieth-century courts used the minimum scrutiny standard when
considering public health regulation, the same standard applied to economic
regulation and civil rights infringement alike.'
This standard presumes
legislation to be valid unless it bears no reasonable relationship to the
achievement of a proper governmental objective.') Using this test, courts
allowed popularly held beliefs about the spread of disease to support the medical

existence); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding the compulsory vaccination
of adults against smallpox even though the statute infringed on personal liberty); Benton v. Reid,
231 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1956); State v. Snow, 324 S.W.2d 532 (Ark. 1959); Moore v. Armstrong,
149 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1963); Greene v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 661 (W. Va. 1980). But see Wendy
E. Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic Docrine, 14 HOFsTRA L. REv. 53
(1985) (arguing against the quarantine of AIDS patients mainly because AIDS is not contagious and
because people can be carriers for their entire lives without actually contracting the disease, and
noting the changing legal climate and the substantially increased role of procedural review since
early quarantine cases).
200. See Crayton v. Larabee, 116 N.E. 355 (N.Y. 1917) (upholding a statute that prohibited
all contact with a house when the occupants contracted smallpox or scarlet fever).
201. Larry Gostin, TraditionalPublicHealth Strategies,in AIDS LAW TODAY 47 (Scott Burris
etal. eds., 2d ed. 1983).
202. See Ex pare Martin, 188 P.2d 287 (Cal. 1948) (holding the state had full power of
quarantine).
203. Because the prevention and treatment capabilities were drastically limited in large part by
the elementary scientific and medical understanding of disease transmission, early states often took
overly drastic measures to cope with the epidemics. These means were evaluated in the context of
the contemporary disease control capabilities. Using these judicial standards today would be
inappropriate given the current disease control capabilities. See infra note 222 and accompanying
text.
204. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
205. See Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373,380 (1915). See also People c rel. Baker v. Strautz,
54 N.E.2d 441, 443 (111. 1944) ("It has almost universally been held in this country that
constitutional guarantees must yield to the enforcement of the statutes and ordinances designed to
promote the public health as a part of the police powers of the State.").
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soundness of a regulation ° and rarely found regulations enacted to protect
public health to be "unreasonable," "arbitrary," or "oppressive. " '
These
limiting principles were articulated in 1905 by the Supreme Court in the
landmark case Jacobson v. Massachusetts and quickly became the universal
standard for reviewing public health legislation.'
Judicial treatment of public health regulation has changed very little since
the turn of the century. Although courts in the 1920s began to require some
showing of medical foundation for protective measures as the science of public
health advanced,' they continued to allow class membership alone to justify
public health restrictions when a disfavored class, such as prostitutes, was the
subject of the regulation."' These judicial opinions assumed that victims were
to blame for their illnesses.2 ' The attitude that the diseased were a menace

206. See Jacobsonv. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 35 (1905) (stating that "the legislature has
the right to pass laws which, according to the common belief of the people, are adapted to prevent
the spread of contagious diseases" and that "'[a] common belief, like common knowledge, does not
require evidence to establish its existence, but may be acted upon without proof by the legislature
and the courts ....
") (quoting Viemeister v. White, 72 N.E. 97 (N.Y. 1904)).
207. See, e.g., Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27, 38 (upholding the compulsory vaccination of adults);
People ex rel. Barmore v. Robertson, 134 N.E. 815, 820 (Ill. 1922) (upholding a quarantine order).
But see Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10, 26 (N.D. Cal. 1900) (invalidating the quarantine of
15,000 Asians after nine deaths from the bubonic plague had been reported in the community).
208. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25, 38.
Although this court has refrained from any attempt to define the limits of that [police]
power, yet it had distinctly recognized the authority of a state to enact quarantine laws
and "health laws of every description" . . . . According to settled principles, the police
power of a state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations
established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the
public safety.
Id. at 25.
The Court also noted the necessity of restrictions on liberty in order to "secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the state." Id. at 26. The Court upheld the statute and did not
even require medical proof of the effectiveness of such precautions. Id. at 27, 30. The Court
reasoned that the vaccine met the rationality test because the "mass of the people" believe that the
vaccine "has a decided tendency to prevent the spread of [a] fearful disease." Id. at 34. The
predilection of the Court to uphold such legislation may signal that courts will treat AIDS legislation
with similar deference.
209. See, e.g., Robertson, 134 N.E. at 819 (stating that quarantine regulations are "sustained
on the law of necessity, and when the necessity ceases, the right to enforce the regulation ceases").
210. See, e.g., Exparte Clemente, 215 P. 698 (Cal. Ct. App. 1923) (holding that a quarantine
was justified because information about a woman's acts of prostitution furnished a reasonable ground
to believe she carried disease); accord Huffman v. District of Columbia, 39 A.2d 558, 562 (D.C.

1944).

211. See, e.g., E parte Company, 139 N.E. 204, 206 (Ohio 1922) (stating that "those who
by conduct and association contract such disease as makes them a menace to the health and morals
of the community must submit to such regulation as will protect the public"); Er pane Dayton, 199
P. 548, 549 (1921) (justifying the jailing of a woman until she submitted to a physical examination
for disease "upon the ground that she is a lewd and dissolute person, and, in fact, a prostitute").
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to both public health and community morals survived through the 1950s and
1960s, when incarcerated tuberculosis patients challenged state authority to
quarantine. 212 Thus, although medical necessity for protective measures was
needed in some cases, society's morality still played a major role in efforts to
prevent the spread of disease.
Examination of public health legislation changed significantly in the 1960s
with the onset of equal protection decisions. These decisions established that
laws infringing upon the fundamental rights of certain classes would be held to
the more demanding review standard of strict scrutiny, a standard once reserved
for classifications based on race, national origin, and alienage. 213 These
classifications were termed "suspect" classifications.214 The Supreme Court
also introduced a middle tier of intermediate scrutiny to the equal protection
analysis, which requires that legislation burdening certain "quasi-suspect" classes
or impairing important, but not fundamental, rights be substantially related to
an important state interest.21 5 In determining whether a classification merits
heightened scrutiny, a court may consider the way the class is treated by others,
the relationship of class members to one another, and the relevance of the class'
defining characteristics to the class members' abilities to participate in
society. 21
Although no one characteristic is determinative, political
powerlessness, stigmatization, a history of unequal treatment, and the inability
of individuals to control their membership may identify the class as a "discrete

212. See, e.g., Moore v. Draper, 57 So. 2d 648, 649 (Fla. 1952).
213. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972). Strict scrutiny requires the state
to prove that the chosen action was the least restrictive alternative: the state must show that the
legislation is drawn with precision, that it is closely tailored to serve the objective, and that there
is no other reasonable way to achieve the goal with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected
activity. See id.
214. According to the Supreme Court, 'unless a classification trammels fundamental personal
rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage," it need
only be "rationally related to a legitimate state interest" to pass muster under the Equal Protection
Clause. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). Thus, HIV carriers will not
be considered a "suspect" class worthy of heightened protection because no established fundamental
personal right is infringed upon by HIV legislation, and no distinction is made by race, religion, or
alienage.
215. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (treating gender classification as
quasi-suspect); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (subjecting a law depriving individuals of their
driver's licenses to intermediate scrutiny). State discrimination against HIV-infected health care
workers need only meet the rational review standard because the deferential treatment does not rest
upon any suspect or quasi-suspect classification scheme. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§

16-2 (2d ed. 1988).

216. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that mental
retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976)
(denying illegitimate children status as a suspect class); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973) (giving heightened scrutiny to gender-based classifications).
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and insular minorit[y]" deserving of special treatment." 7 Under this analysis,
public health legislation controlling the behavior of HIV carriers would have to
be substantially related to an important state interest if HIV carriers are
considered a "quasi-suspect" class of people."' Thus, they will be entitled to
more constitutional protection by virtue of the heightened burden of proof. If
carriers are not considered part of a "quasi-suspect" class, HIV legislation will
only have to satisfy the mere rationality test developed throughout traditional
public health law.219
Furthermore, most public health precedent predates the developments
during this century in both judicial construction of the Constitution and evolution
of medical science. In the last two decades, the Supreme Court has expanded
and redefined the scope of constitutionally protected individual rights. More
specifically, the unenumerated substantive due process right of privacy has
undergone significant development in the last decades.m The Supreme Court
has held that the privacy right encompasses both a general interest of autonomy
in making "certain kinds of important decisions" and an individual interest in the
nondisclosure of "personal matters.""2 This change in the construction of the
right to privacy changes the analysis of public health laws because the disclosure
of people's medical conditions could be considered a violation of their newly
protected privacy rights, and the states' interest in the laws would have to be
stronger.
Revolutionary innovations in methods of disease control since the early
years of this century have paralleled the development of constitutionally
protected individual rights. Important medical developments now allow more
closely targeted efforts to control communicable disease.'
Fifty years ago,

217. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
218. Commentators have addressed the issue of whether homosexuals should be considered a
recognized classification. Although the Supreme Court has neither granted nor refused homosexuals
quasi-suspect or suspect status, commentators have made a strong case for heightened scrutiny of
classifications based on sexual preference. See, e.g., Note, The Constitutiona Status of Sexual
Orentation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1985); Harvis
M. Miller II, Note, An Arguwnen for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to
ClassificationsBased on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL.L. REV. 797 (1984).
219. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
220. The Court in the 19 60s and 1970s expanded the traditional sphere of marital privacy. See,
e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
221. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
222. Researchers have begun to show medical and scientific causes of transmission of
communicable diseases. This progress has enabled public health officials to target high risk groups
and to encourage prevention techniques that are closely linked to the means of transmission. For
example, prostitutes were formerly quarantined because their immorality caused the spread of
sexually transmitted diseases. See supranote 210 and accompanying text. Today, researchers have
established that the sexual behavior, not the immorality, causes the spread of the diseases. Because
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quarantine may have been the least restrictive means of controlling some
communicable diseases, but large-scale quarantine is now rarely justified. 3
Research, education, and individual treatment characterize the modem approach
to public health policy, and courts now commonly rely on medical, rather than
popular, assessments of the appropriate public health actions.'
For example,
the current state of scientific knowledge has made it possible to develop a basic
biological understanding of HIV in a fraction of the time it would have taken
twenty years ago.'
Such advances in scientists' understandings of viral
etiology' now allow closely targeted efforts to stop the spread of the disease.
Thus, drastic measures, such as quarantine, would have little chance of being
judicially upheld because of the enormous intrusion on the rights of the carriers
compared to the minimal risk the carriers pose to society in everyday activities.
Society's concern that HIV will continue to spread is legitimate. However,
apprehension that efforts to slow its transmission may violate the civil rights of
carriers and members of high-risk groups is also legitimate. IV regulation
affects many rights of these individuals, including the rights to liberty, privacy,
property, free association, and free expression.
When constitutionally
challenged, such regulation should be evaluated under the proper level of
scrutiny to determine if the state interest at stake is compelling, important, or
legitimate.'
If the regulation meets the purpose test, then the relationship
between the state's objective and the means employed to achieve it must be
considered. 2m
Society has placed a stigma on those infected with HIV, and thus a program

of frequent sexual contact, prostitutes are in a high risk group for both contacting and transmitting
diseases. Therefore, they should be targeted for education on preventive measures, such as
condoms. This example demonstrates the progression of society's understanding of the social and
scientific aspects of the transmission of communicable diseases.
223. See Scott Burris, Note, Fear Itself AIDS, Herpes and Public Health Decisions, 3 YALE
L. & POL'Y Ruv. 479 (1985) (chronicling twentieth-century developments in medicine and public
health case law); see also Michael S. Morgenstern, The Role of the Federal Government in
Protecting Ctizens from CommunicableDiseases, 47 U. CIN. L. REv. 537, 543-44 (1978) (outlining
the history of federal public health programs).
224. See, e.g., New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644,
650-51 (2d Cir. 1979) (granting the state leave to return to court with a plan executed "in light of
the most current medical information"); LaRocca v. Dalsheim, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302, 311 (Sup. Ct.
1983) (declining, after consideration of a medical opinion, to require that a prison protect healthy
prisoners from HIV, but granting leave to renew claims as the state of scientific knowledge and
hygienic procedures evolved).
225. See HARv. MED. SCH. LETTE, Dec. 1985, at 5, col.2.
226. Viral etiology is the study of the causes and origins of viruses. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY 467 (2d college ed. 1985).
227. See infra note 237 and accompanying text.
228. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 633 (1969).
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for the control of this disease is difficult to facilitate. 229 In short, HIV has
been socially defined as a disease of marginal groups.'
Because of the
stigma attached to HIV carriers,"t improper state purpose for legislation
infringing upon carriers' liberty should be a concern of courts reviewing such
legislation, especially when important civil rights are at issue. Although courts
have not often been willing to inquire into the motives of legislators,'m the
Supreme Court has held that courts, especially in equal protection cases, should
not accept assertions of legislative purpose at face value, when an examination
of the legislative scheme and its history demonstrates that the asserted purpose
could not have been a goal of the legislation. 3 The failure of a state to

229. Dr. Michael Merson, director of the WHO's Global Program on AIDS, recounted the
AIDS epidemic in its worldwide social framework during the Eighth International Conference on
AIDS in 1992. He explained that HIV feeds on society's weakness because it thrives on our
reluctance to discuss sexuality. Dr. Michael Merson, Director of WHO's Global Program on AIDS,
Address at the Eight Int'l Conference on AIDS, Morocco (Dec. 12-16, 1993), cited in Amy Lou
Raney, Legislative Instruments Dealing ith AIDS and the Importance ofEducation, 27 INT'L LAW.
495 n.30 (1993). He went on to remark that HIV exploits the desperate inadequacies of our health
and social systems, such as poverty, gender, inequality, and racial discrimination. Id.; see generally
Infections Climb to Two-Thirds of World Total, Conferees Told, supra note 23, at 8.
Problems associated with HIV are not confined to the United States. Australia and Great
Britain have taken stringent measures to prevent the spread of HIV. In both of these countries, the
public's health is a top priority. A 1984 amendment to the Australian Queensland Health Act allows
a government official to "give information [regarding an individual's HIV status] to any department
or official of the government of the Commonwealth having ... a legitimate interest in possessing
the information." Marlene C. McGuirl & Robert N. Gee, AIDS: An Overview of the British,
Australian, and American Responses, 14 HoFSitA L. REv. 107, 116 (1985). Also, anyone who
suspects that they may have HIV must report to a physician within three days or be subject to a fine.
Id. Great Britain health laws provide for compulsory hospital detention and examination for those
suspected of having HIV. Id. at 113. These two countries seek to promote the public health, even
at the expense of informational privacy interests. As commentators have stated: "Where AIDS is
concerned, the British apparently feel that the need to protect the public easily outweighs the
individual's interest in freedom from government intervention." Id. at 113.
230. The Florida Supreme Court neatly phrased the problem: "AIDS is the modern day
equivalent of leprosy. AIDS, or a suspicion of AIDS, can lead to discrimination in employment,
education, housing, and even medical treatment." Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Serva., Inc.,
500 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1987) (citation omitted). As a result, public perceptions of AIDS have
unveiled thinly disguised prejudices about race, religion, social class, sex, and nationality.
231. The stigma is primarily due to the disease's close association with homosexuality and
intravenous drug use. Id.
232. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1092-1101
(1969).
233. The law "reflects and expresses certain attitudes and preferences." Michael H. Shapiro,
On Not Watering All the Flowers: Regulatory Theory and the Funding of Heart Transplantation,
28 JURIMETRIcS J. 21, 23 (1987). This notion is quite logical and intuitive. Id. The values of a
society are necessarily inculcated into its laws. Id. For instance, the criminal law prohibits drug
abuse at least in part because it poses a significant risk to one's health. The criminal law is based
upon the moral principle that life is sacred and should be preserved. See Patrick Devlin, The
Enforcement of Morals, reprinted in pan in CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 238 (Sanford H.
Kadish et al. eds., 4th ed. 1983). However, the values of the majority must not be allowed to
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characterize a regulation accurately and limit its scope undermines the claim that
the compelling purpose of controlling HIV is the rule's true objective.' Even
under minimum scrutiny, the Court has looked closely at state-articulated
justifications and evaluated them for their credibility, factual foundation, and
235
logical consistency, striking down a rule that rested on irrational prejudice.
With this in mind, regulation designed to preserve public health23 by
controlling HIV will almost certainly meet the proper purpose requirement,
whether at the strict, intermediate, or minimum level of scrutiny. 7 HIV's
potential to spread at an exponential rate supports the proposition that strong
preventive measures could be appropriate.?
Quieting the unsubstantiated

manifest themselves in discriminatory laws. Thus, the true intent behind legislation must be
uncovered. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975); Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969) (rejecting a city's articulated justification for a racially discriminatory
rule).
234. See New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 650 (2d
Cir. 1979) (finding that the identification and quarantine of some, but not all, children carrying
hepatitis B suggested that 'the Board did not regard its own evidence of risk as particularly
convincing"). This type of inquiry should be useful in determining the true purpose of HIV-control
regulations; the classes of people who pose the greatest health threat to the population rarely have
been singled out for specific action. For example, intravenous drug users pose the most direct threat
to the heterosexual majority and make up a growing percentage of the HIV patients. See Centers
for Disease Control, Heterosexual Transmission of Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type
IlI/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALrrY WKLY. REP. 561 (1985).
Nevertheless, gays are more often singled out as culpable and dangerous. See Ronald Bayer, AIDS
and the Gay Community: Between the Specter and the Promise of Medicine, 52 Soc. RESEARCH
581, 589 (1985). American jurisdictions have all but ignored eliminating a significant means of
transmitting HIV-shared intravenous needles. In the United States, where needles can be purchased
only by prescription, 26% of AIDS patients have been intravenous drug users; in Canada, where
needles are sold over the counter and are thus in such ready supply that few persons are likely to
be tempted to share needles, the figure is 0.5%. See HARv. MED. SCH. LETTER, supra note 225
at 5, col. 2.
235. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
236. See, e.g., Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218 (Miss. 1979) (finding the state's interest in
compulsory vaccination of school children sufficiently compelling to override parents' religious
interests), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 887 (1980).
237. Under strict scrutiny, the state carries the burden of advancing a compelling justification
for its action. Intermediate scrutiny requires the state to show that the legislation serves an
"important" state objective. Under minimum scrutiny, legislation is presumed valid and will be
upheld if it advances any legitimate state interest. See The Supreme Court, 1984 Term, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 120, 161-62 (1985).
238. See Stephen Collier, Preventing the Spreadof AIDS by RestrictingSexual Conduct in Gay
Bathhouses: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 15 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 301 (1985). See also Steven
Lee Myers, Adult Movie Theatre is Shut as a Health Hazard, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 23, 1994, at C23;
Mireya Navarro, Regulationsfor Sex Clubs are Strengthened in Effort to Curb AIDS Risk, N.Y.
TIm4s, Jan. 22, 1994, at C25. See Thomas C. Quinn et al., AIDS in the Americas: An Emerging
Public Health Crisis, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1005, 1007 (1989) (reporting that Cuba implemented
screening of the entire population for HIV and isolation of seropositive persons).
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fears of the voting public, however, is neither a compelling, important, nor
legitimate state interest. 9
Furthermore, the state does not have an
appropriate interest in discriminatory laws, disguised as public health regulation,
that are actually designed to attack or harass members of high risk groups.'
Further, the concern as to the appropriate governmental purpose for HIV
legislation causes courts to examine the medical reality behind the policymakers'
assertions to expose what motivated their choice of means. For example, since
it has been established that seropositive dentists pose virtually no risk to patients
except during invasive procedures, courts would likely find that restrictions on
seropositive dentists limiting the scope of their duties beyond such procedures
do not in fact decrease the risk of HIV transmission."
Courts would then
conclude that if seropositive dentists pose no risk to patients by the nature of
their duties, or if they follow the CDC's universal precautions, then a policy
significantly limiting the scope of their duties is probably based on an
impermissible motive or on misinformation. Discrimination on the basis of
prejudice, misinformation, or ignorance cannot be countenanced under the Equal
Protection Clause.
Thus, courts would find the policy unconstitutional.
However, forcing dentists and patients to release their serostatus to each other
prevents the further spread of HIV, decreases society's anxiety about the virus
because of the increase in discussion and education, expedites efforts to find a
cure for the virus by allowing medical researchers to chart the course of the
disease, and reinforces the important value of protecting and cherishing human
life ' 2 Thus, a guideline for disclosure would be found to be medically
grounded.
However, a law requiring patients to disclose their seropositive conditions
to their dentists before treatment would have to be closely examined to ensure
that legislators had a legitimate purpose or motivation. For example, if
disclosure is sought to enable dentists to refuse treatment to seropositive
patients, the government's purpose would not be considered proper and the law
would fail. However, if the purpose of disclosure is to promote accurate
diagnoses and effective treatments, the law would be appropriate and upheld.
In sum, states have traditionally had the responsibility and authority to
239. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that negative
attitudes or unsubstantiated fears are not permissible justifications for treating a home for the
mentally retarded differently from other multiple dwellings).
240. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) ("Mere public intolerance or
animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical liberty.").
241. See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
242. As Laurence H. Tribe noted, "[o]bviously, the compilation of accurate information about
the incidence and transmission of this fatal condition is essential for the development of an effective
public health response." See TRIBE, supra note 215, at 1394.
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promote and protect public health, even at the expense of some rights of disease
victims.'
Public health laws generally are reviewed under a minimum
scrutiny analysis, whereby legislation is presumed to be valid unless it bears no
reasonable relationship to the achievement of a proper governmental
objective.'
Under this analysis, most legislation aimed at protecting public
health has been upheld.'
However, the development of equal protection case
law introduced a new angle to the review of public health statutes.'
Legislation infringing upon fundamental rights of certain groups is held to the
more demanding review standard of strict scrutiny, a standard once reserved for
suspect classifications based on race, national origin, and alienage.' 7 Further,
legislation burdening certain "quasi-suspect" classes or impairing important, but
not fundamental, rights must be substantially related to an important state
interest.'
Thus, if HIV carriers are deemed a "quasi-suspect" class,
legislation impairing their rights will have to satisfy a higher standard of scrutiny
than the rational basis test. Regardless of the level of scrutiny applied to a piece
of legislation, however, the state will have to demonstrate a legitimate purpose
and a medical foundation for the law. The examination of various proposed
laws suggests that this basic requirement has been and will continue to be a
stumbling block for legislative progress in controlling HIV until all facets of the
health care industry work together with the policymakers to design legislation
grounded in a legitimate state interest and a sound medical foundation.
VI.

BALANCING PRIVACY AND PUBLIC HEALTH
IN THE CONTEXT OF DENTISTRY

A. Balancing the Interests Generally
The HIV crisis has presented an irreconcilable conflict of interest, whereby
HIV carriers are reluctant to disclose their conditions because they fear invasions
of their privacy and subsequent discrimination, 9 while the public demands
information to curb the spread of the virus. Carriers are caught in a dilemma
in which they have a profound desire for information that may contribute to
prevention or treatment of HIV, but also a particularly acute need for privacy.
However, the very information that may be useful in protecting the public health
may directly infringe upon the privacy so desperately needed.'

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 213-21.
See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
See supra note 230-31.
See supra notes 159-90 and accompanying text.
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to this seemingly hopeless conflict in the context of dentistry emerges upon a
closer examination of the reasons why the problem has not yet been addressed
effectively. By examining the conflict of interests surrounding a few of the most
important issues, a consistent way to manage HIV in dental offices will emerge.
Three basic practices will create the cornerstone of a solution to curbing
transmission. First, strict sterilization procedures must be followed in all dental
facilities and with all patients." No infection control system will be effective
without uniform enforcement of these procedures. 2
Practicing such
procedures minimizes the risk of transmission of HIV, as well as many other
communicable diseases. 3 Furthermore, reliable sterilization techniques make
disclosure between patients and dentists less important since the procedures
alone should virtually eliminate any risk of transmission.2
Second, maintaining confidentiality of medical information about the virus
is crucial. Rather than posing an obstacle for proponents of HIV reporting and
testing laws, the individual interest in confidentiality is in fact an important
weapon in the disease control effort. Protection of the confidentiality of
potential HIV carriers should help to create an atmosphere conducive to
voluntary participation in reporting, testing, and educational programs."s Full
participation in these programs will in turn promote the success of efforts to
isolate, treat, and cure the deadly disease.
Finally, patients and dentists must be educated about the disease, its
symptoms, and its modes of transmission.'
They must understand that the
virus cannot be transmitted through casual contact and that the risk of
transmission in a dental office is extremely low. 7 Increasing awareness of the
disease will minimize the irrational fears and negative stereotyping that
frequently surround it.'
Patients will be less afraid of contracting the virus

251. Currently, the CDC guidelines are the governing authority on sterilization. See supra note

58.
252. See supra note 58.
253. See supra note 58.
254. See supra note 58.
255. People will be more willing to share medical information and be voluntarily tested if they
think the information will be kept confidential.
256. See supra notes 20-47 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 20-47 and accompanying text.
258. The highly publicized case of Ryan White dramatically illustrates the need for AIDS
education. Frederic C. Kass, Schoolchildrenwith AIDS, in AIDS AND THE LAW 66, 76 (Harlon L.
Dalton & Scott Burris eds., 1987). Ryan, a thirteen-year-old hemophiliac with AIDS, was denied
admittance to Western Middle School in Kokomo, Indiana. The state guidelines allowed children
with AIDS to be admitted to public school provided they behave acceptably (e.g., do not bite, are
toilet-trained) and have no uncoverable sores or skin eruptions. INDIANA STATE BOARD OF HEALTH,
GUIDELINES FOR CHILDREN FOR CHILDREN WITH AIDS/ARC ATTENDING SCHOOL (July 1985).
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from their dentists, and dentists will be more willing to treat seropositive
patients.'
Furthermore, dentists must receive special training in diagnosing
and treating oral manifestations of HIV.NO
There are several additional steps which need to be taken to effectively curb
HIV transmission in dental offices. These steps tend to be more intrusive into
privacy and other liberty interests. Therefore, they require further analysis as
to balancing the privacy interests with the public health concerns to determine
what kind of legislation would be constitutional given the standards of review
used by courts." Because informational privacy has not yet been deemed a
fundamental right by the Supreme Court, a balancing of the harm and benefit
from legislation infringing upon this interest, rather than strict scrutiny, would
be appropriate. 2 Moreover, legislation designed to protect public health will
only be held to a mere rationality standard unless the law infringes upon a
suspect classification or a substantial, but not fundamental, interest.2 0 Thus,
each of these additional and necessary steps should be examined with these
standards in mind to determine where the balance between the competing
interests rests.
B. Seropositive Patients
The issue of whether seropositive patients may be forced to disclose their
conditions to their dentists is important to the general public, but particularly
important to those patients who are carrying the virus or who are in a high-risk
group. These patients argue that disclosing their serostatus to their dentists

Although Ryan met all of the state's criteria and presented a very minimal threat to his classmates
and teachers, he was still denied enrollment. Ryan's family was forced to seek an injunction to
prevent the school from denying Ryan admittance. White v. Western Sch. Corp., IP 85-1192-C
(S.D. Ind. 1985); see also District 27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ. of New York, 502
N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (concluding that the denial of public school admission to children
with AIDS violated their rights). For a more detailed discussion of the benefits of AIDS education,
see Jane Harris Aiken, Education as Prevention, in AIDS AND THE LAw 90 (Harlon L. Dalton et
al. eds., 1987). It is argued that AIDS education will prevent the spread of the disease because
knowledge of how HIV is spread will result in proper precautions and a decreased amount of
discrimination. Id. at 91-95.
259. One dentist noted a decline in patients who seek dental care, which was presumably
attributable to the fear of contracting HIV. See Jeffrey M. Gold, FearofAIDS Keeps Dentist Chairs
Empty, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 3, 1991, at D14. See also Mireya Navarro, Patients Grilling Health
Workers on AIDS, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 2, 1991, at BI (reporting some doctors and dentists believe
that patients delay procedure and treatment because of fear of HIV infection, and dentists in the New
York Metropolitan area reported cancellations after the newspapers reported the death of an HIVinfected dentist).
260. See supra note 9.
261. See supra note 237.
262. See supra notes 108-61 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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would violate their privacy and could lead to discrimination and other forms of
Since the right to informational privacy has not been deemed
harassment.'
a fundamental right by the Supreme Court,' courts reviewing a law requiring
disclosure on the part of seropositive patients would balance the privacy interests
of these patients against the public health interest in obtaining such
information.2 "
Carriers argue that disclosure of their conditions to friends, insurance
These carriers anticipate
companies, or employers could be disastrous.'
discrimination in the workplace and rejection from their insurance companies.
Furthermore, they fear that many seropositive patients will be refused dental
treatment or may not be treated with the same level of courtesy and
professionalism that seronegative patients enjoy. Moreover, many patients see
no need for dentists to know their serostatus because they do not believe it
relates to their receipt of dental treatment. Thus, they argue that the intrusion
into their privacy is not justified by the minimal benefit which could be derived
from disclosure.
However, this perspective is unfounded. There are several reasons why it
is imperative that dentists know the serostatus of the patients they are
treating.' "
Perhaps the most obvious is that dentists could take extra
precautions and care in treating these patients to minimize the possibility of
transmission to themselves, to other dental staff, and to other patients. 2 This
in and of itself is a strong interest in which the government has a legitimate
purpose in protecting. However, the public health concern goes much deeper
than giving the dentists a chance to "double-glove" or to clean the operatories
with special care.
Making dentists aware of patients' seropositive conditions is crucial to
ensure that patients receive proper dental care. As with other kinds of doctors,
dentists must have a complete medical history on each patient to ensure that
Because oral
maladies are characterized and treated properly.'
manifestations of HIV are common in most carriers, proper diagnosis of the
lesions is critical to the treatment received by these patients. 27' Furthermore,
dentists need to know medications and other forms of treatment seropositive

264.
265.
266.
Milton S.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

See supra notes 230-31.
See supra notes 108-45 and accompanying text.
See generally Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 909 F.2d 820, 833 (5th Cir. 1990); In re
Hershey Medical Ctr., 595 A.2d 1290 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
See supra note 230-31.
See supra note 9.
See supra note 33.
See supra note 9.
See supra note 9.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol29/iss1/5

Lawyer: HIV and Dentistry

1994]

HIV AND DENTISTRY

349

patients are receiving from physicians to prevent dangerous interactions with
medications prescribed for oral conditions.'
Dentists are part of the overall
medical team for the patients, thus they must have accurate medical histories of
patients and must work in concert with physicians to prevent dangerous conflicts
in treatments.'
Disclosure is in the best interests of seropositive patients to
ensure safe and effective treatment. 4 Furthermore, this information protects
dentists from potential malpractice suits for failing to properly diagnose or treat
seropositive patients if the dentists did not know of the presence of the virus and
of prescriptions.
Therefore, the interests in minimizing the risk of transmission, in
preserving the health of the patients through promoting proper diagnoses and
treatments, and in preventing dentists from facing malpractice charges outweigh
the seropositive patients' privacy interests and warrant an infringement on the
privacy interests to the extent of mandating disclosure. However, any law
requiring such disclosure must also afford strong measures to protect the
confidentiality of the information and must not require disclosure to any parties
other than the treating dentists. Once the information is released, these
conditions on the law must make sure: that the privacy interests will be preserved
and respected to the greatest extent possible.
C. Seropositive Dentists
Determining how to deal with seropositive dentists raises sensitive ethical
questions. 5 Do dentists have a duty to be tested and to monitor their
serostatus? Furthermore, do dentists have a duty to disclose positive results to
their patients before treatment begins? Most people believe that dentists do
indeed have an ethical duty to be tested and to disclose positive test results to
their patients.'S There is more controversy, however, as to whether a legal
duty to be tested and to disclose can constitutionally be imposed on dentists. To
determine the answer, the privacy interests of the dentists should be weighed
against the public's interest in obtaining the information.
Given that one of the possible routes of transmission is through blood-toblood contact, dentists can transmit the virus when performing invasive
procedures by cutting themselves and thereby commingling their infected blood
with the blood of their patients.'
Since the virus can be transmitted in this

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

See generally AMESICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 9.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 62.
See supra note 8.
See supra note 9.
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manner, proposals which would require testing the dentists or which would
restrict the procedures practiced by seropositive dentists must be evaluated.
Like seropositive patients, dentists who have the virus are concerned about
breaches in their right of privacy caused by testing and disclosure schemes.
Dentists worry that disclosure of their serostatus will cause them to lose their
professional insurance coverage and will force them out of practice. Even if this
does not happen, they could lose their practices anyway if their patients are
made aware of their condition. 7 Few, if any, patients are willing to risk
being treated by a seropositive dentist even though the actual chance of
transmission is extremely small.'
The competing public health interest in obtaining the serostatus reports of
dentists is significant. Patients argue that they have a right under the doctrine
of informed consent to know if their dentists are infected so that they can make
informed decisions about pursuing treatment.'
Patients point to the Kimberly
Bergalis case and argue that they should at least be entitled to know which
dentists are seropositive since they have no way knowing whether proper
sterilization techniques are being strictly followed. 2 ' Patients want dentists
to be reviewed and supervised to make sure that the risk of transmission is
extinguished in all dental offices. In fact, many patients feel that all dentists
should be tested, and those who are infected should cease practicing completely
because jeopardizing the life of even one patient is too great a risk to bear.'
While very few individuals might contract HIV from their dentists, the good of

278. See Beverly Beyette, The Plight of a Gay Pediatrician, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1987, at
El. A successful pediatrician in Texas was discovered to be a homosexual with AIDS. Id. When
this information became public, the physician's practice immediately evaporated. Id. When parents
discovered the doctor had AIDS, they were furious and wanted to "crucify him," notwithstanding
the fact that medical evidence indicated that it was highly unlikely to transmit HIV in such a
situation. Id.
The AIDS hysteria has provoked numerous examples of this irrationality. See, e.g., Chalk
v. United States Dist. Court Cent. Dist., 840 F.2d 701, 703 (9th Cir. 1988) (concerning the
termination of a teacher with HIV); Cronan v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., No. 860242 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1986) (resulting from coworkers of an AIDS victim who refused to use a
truck previously driven by him and who threatened to kill the victim if he ever returned to work
from a leave of absence); Poff v. Caro, 549 A.2d 900, 903 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1987)
(concerning a landlord who refused to rent an apartment to three gay men for fear of AIDS); David
M. Freedman, Wrong Without Remedy, 72 A.B.A. J. 34, 40 (1986) (reporting that a judge in
Florida required AIDS victims to wear masks in his courtroom); John Parry, AIDS as a
HandicappingCondition, 9 MENrAL & PHYSIcAL DiSAITirY L. REP. 402 (1985) (reporting that
Los Angeles paramedics denied prompt assistance to a heart attack victim because they feared he had
AIDS).
279. See supra note 278.
280. See supra note 8.
281. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. See also notes 1-2.
282. See supra note 8.
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the many must take precedence over the good of the few.

3

Many schemes requiring testing and disclosure for all dentists are
problematic because they pose too great a burden on privacy rights or fail to
sufficiently protect public health to be constitutionally valid. Although the
legitimate state interest in preventing transmission from dentists to patients is
being promoted, such legislation extends beyond the scope of the medical
realities about transmission, and the privacy rights of the dentists are not
protected at all. More specifically, the intrusion into the privacy of dentists
caused by universal mandatory testing and disclosure is not warranted by the
benefit to public health.'
The risk of transmission of the virus is so minute
in a dental setting that it does not support the personal, financial, and
administrative burdens imposed by compulsory screening of all dentists.285
Furthermore, disclosing dentists' seropositive conditions to their patients is also
not warranted by the risk of transmission. The harm caused by disclosure is
extensive, including the doubtless termination of their practices and the end of
their clinical careers. Thus, mandatory testing and disclosure provisions for all
dentists are too drastic and cause too great a deprivation of privacy rights given
the actual medical risk of transmission of the virus from dentist to patient.
Testing and disclosure provisions should be drafted to provide the greatest
amount of protection to both the privacy of the dentists and the safety of the
public health. Because a minute risk of transmission from a dentist to a patient
does exist, 8 measures calling for the testing of those dentists posing the
greatest risk could be acceptable. However, for the invasion of privacy to be
warranted, these measures must apply only to those dentists who perform
invasive procedures or who otherwise pose greater risks to their patients than do
those in general practice. Furthermore, having dentists share their seropositive
conditions could also be appropriate to protect the public health as long as
certain steps are taken to protect the confidential nature of the information.
Perhaps the ideal way to protect the privacy of the dentist, while also
preserving the public's safety, is to have seropositive dentists report to a third

283. This philosophy is ingrained in American jurisprudence. Individuals are often forced to
accept tragedy and injustice so that other important values and rights that impact upon society as a
whole are safeguarded. For example, the doctrine of public necessity in tort law allows the state
to destroy a citizen's personal property without compensation to protect a greater number of citizens'
property. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 109, at 146-47. So too, when Holocaust survivors
who live in Skokie are told that they must endure Nazis parading in their home town, or when
individuals convicted of serious crimes are permitted to go free because of illegally obtained
evidence, the good of the many is placed above the needs of the few.
284. See supra note 53.
285. See supra note 53.
286. See supra note 9.
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party, such as an expert review panel.w This panel would be responsible for
limiting the scope of seropositive dentists' practices to only those procedures
posing virtually no risk to patients and would be charged with supervising their
activities and sterilization procedures.'
The panel would protect the welfare
of the public by providing a means of supervising and limiting the activities of
seropositive dentists.'
At the same time, dentists would not be required to
release their status to their patients because the panel would assess the risk posed
to patients and would take the appropriate measures to minimize this risk. 9'
This would mean that liability for any transmission from a seropositive dentist
to patient while under the supervision of an expert review panel would be shared
between the infected dentist and the panel supervising the dentist. Thus, more
people would have a stake in preventing transmission and would be held
accountable for any negligent mishaps. In the end, this will benefit public health
because seropositive dentists and their expert review panels will be forced to use
the utmost care in deciding what the scope of the dentists' activities should be.
D. Conclusion
If society is to survive the HIV epidemic with both public health and civil
liberties intact, it is essential to determine where the Constitution draws the line
between the protection of public health and the defense of individual liberty.'29
In light of the significance of both privacy and health interests, no decision will
be reached without anguish and cost. It is time for the ADA and the legislature
to work together to find an acceptable balance and to develop an aggressive,
comprehensive plan to attack the problem.

287. See supra text accompanying note 79. See also infra section VII.
288. See supra text accompanying note 79. See also infra section VII.
289. See supra text accompanying note 80. See also infra section VII.
290. See supra text accompanying note 80. See also infra section VII.
291. A variety of public health measures might generate constitutional issues. For example,
litigants have challenged the constitutionality of orders closing bathhouses, City of New York v.
New Saint Mark's Baths, 497 N.Y.S.2d 979 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986), and segregating prisoners with
AIDS from other inmates, Cordero v. Coughlin, 607 F. Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Although the
analysis developed in this note may be useful in evaluating the constitutionality of some of these
measures, a detailed consideration of these measures outside the dental setting is beyond the scope
of this note. For further discussions about the constitutionality of these and other restraints, see
Leonard Orland & Sue L. Wise, The AIDS Epidemic: A Constitutional Conundnm, 14 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 137 (1985); Judith A. Rabin, The AIDS Epidemic and Gay Bathhouses: A Constimional
Analysis, 10 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 729 (1986); Note, The ConstitutionalRights of AIDS
Carriers,99 HARV. L. REV. 1274 (1986). For an eloquent argument that all coercive restraints to
control AIDS are immoral, see Richard D. Mohr, AIDS, Gay Life, State Coercion, 6 RARITAN 38
(1986).
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PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE

No piece of legislation or dental association policy to date has addressed all
of the issues involved in curbing transmission of HIV in dental offices.m
This pieceInstead, each has taken only a narrow approach to the problem.'
among
standards
to
create
uniform
and
fails
meal approach is insufficient
together
in a
of
the
issues
address
all
standards
must
dentists. Effective
comprehensive proposal supported by both legislators and dentists. The
legislature and the dental associations must cooperate and support the same goals
and the means by which to achieve those goals for any legislation to have
enough respect and enforcement power to make progress in minimizing the risk
of transmission.
Carefully drafted legislation and dental association policies balancing the
competing interests of HIV carriers and the public health will begin to make the
issue of HIV in dentistry more manageable. The guidelines suggested here take
a strong stand both on disclosure and on confidentiality. They are generated
from the notion that everyone will be safer if information is available to the
appropriate parties and if seropositive people believe their medical information
will be held in the strictest confidence. The guidelines mandate stiff sanctions
against those who breach this confidentiality and those who fail to closely follow
the provisions. Civil and criminal penalties create a strong incentive to comply
with the statute and are extremely important to its overall success and
implementation.
The statute proposed here is limited in application to patients and dentists.
A statute actually implemented would have to address the rights and
responsibilities of the other dental workers, namely hygienists, in coping with
the potential presence of HIV. Extending the scope of the statute would be
critical in trying to attack the problem comprehensively. Additionally, this
proposed statute does not directly address the quandary of enforcing strict
sterilization and infection control procedures, which is truly at the heart of
This is primarily due to the enactment
minimizing the risk of transmission.'
of the Dole amendment to the Postal Service and General Government
Appropriation Act of 1992, requiring state legislatures to adopt practice
guidelines for HIV-positive health care workers based on the guidelines
This Act should force states to implement
promulgated by the CDC.'

292. See supra notes 51-85 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 51-85 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 33.
295. Pub. L. No. 102-141, § 633, 105 Stat. 834, 876 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300ee-2 (1988
& Supp. IV 1992)) (detailing the steps that states must take regarding the prevention of HIV and
hepatitis-B virus transmission in order to avoid becoming ineligible for assistance under Public
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rigorous infection control standards. ' Thus, it would be counterproductive
to create competing legislation. Before any legislation similar to what is
proposed here could be enacted, legislators should carefully scrutinize the
reaction to the Act to evaluate the potential degree of cooperation and
compliance with the infection control procedures. If the reaction is negative,
then further measures would be appropriate to address the problem.
FEDERAL STATUTE GOVERNING HIV CONTROL IN DENTISTRY

Chapter 1: Definitions
§1

(1) AIDS:

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome caused by the

Human Immunodeficiency Virus. Full-blown AIDS is diagnosed when
an individual is found to have one or more of the following illnesses:
(1) opportunistic infection, (2) Kaposi's sarcoma, (3) high-grade, Bcell lymphoma, (4) AIDS-dementia/encephalopathy syndrome, or (5)
wasting syndrome (slim disease).
(2) HIV: Human Immunodeficiency Virus causing AIDS and other
opportunistic diseases.
(3) Oral Invasive Procedures: exposure-prone procedures performed
within the mouth which expose significant amounts of blood and/or
mucous membranes and which call for the simultaneous presence of
dentists' fingers and needles or other sharp instruments in the mouth;
procedures with higher risk of dentists cutting themselves due to poor
visualization or to a highly confined anatomic site.
(4) Oral Surgery: the branch of dentistry dealing with diseases and
injuries in the oral cavity or on the lower half of the face requiring
operative procedures which include, but are not limited to:
extractions, skin grafts, bone treatments, and mass biopsies and
removal.
(5) Periodontics: the branch of dentistry concerned with the
prevention and treatment of the supportive tissues surrounding the
teeth.
(6). Seropositive: when a person tests positive for having the HIV
antibodies.

Health Service Act). See supra note 57.
296. See supra note 57.
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Chapter 2: Seropositive Patients
§ 1 (1) All dental patients who know they have HIV, have tested positive
for the virus, or have AIDS or any related illness have a legal duty to:
(a) truthfully and accurately disclose this information to
their dentists before any kind of treatment is rendered;
(b) truthfully and accurately disclose to the dentists the names
and doses of all medications being taken at the time of dental
treatment before such treatment is rendered; and
(c) truthfully and accurately disclose to the dentists the names,
addresses, and phone numbers of all physicians who are treating
or have treated the patients for HIV related conditions before any
dental treatment is rendered.
(2) Any patient who fails to act according to Section 1(1) of this
Chapter may be refused treatment by a dentist for intentionally
supplying false or inaccurate medical information.
(3) Any patient who fails to act according to Section 1(1) of this
Chapter commits a Class A misdemeanor punishable by up to one year
in prison and/or a fine of up to $5000. Furthermore, any patient who
fails to act according to Section 1(1) of this Chapter may be held
civilly and/or criminally liable for any injuries caused by this failure.
Such injuries include, but are not limited to, transmission of the virus
to the dentist, to other dental staff, or to other patients.
(4) Dental personnel shall not disclose information provided pursuant
to Section 1(1) of this Chapter without the explicit permission of the
patient. Any violation of this confidentiality shall be governed by
Section 3(2) of this Chapter.
§ 2 (1) No dentist may refuse treatment to a patient solely on the basis of
the patient's seropositive status.
(2) In instances where a patient is seropositive, decisions with regard
to the type of dental treatment provided or referrals suggested should
be made on the same basis as they are made with other patients.
Referrals are appropriate when dentists believe they are in need of
another's skills, knowledge, equipment, or experience or when dentists
believe, after consultation with patients' physicians, that the patients'
health would be significantly compromised by the provision of dental
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treatment.
§ 3 (1) Dentists shall have a right to share medical knowledge with any
and all physicians who have treated or are currently treating the
dentists' seropositive patients if this information is relevant to the
patients' dental treatment without risking a violation of state or federal
anti-discrimination laws and confidentiality laws. However, dentists
shall not disclose this information to persons other than treating
physicians and the respective patients without explicit permission from
those patients. Any violation of this confidentiality shall be governed
by Section 3(2) of this Chapter.
(2) A person responsible for recording, reporting, or maintaining
information required to be reported under this Chapter who recklessly,
knowingly, or intentionally discloses or fails to protect medical
information classified as confidential under this Section commits a
Class A misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in prison and/or
a fine of up to $5000.
Chapter 3: Seropositive Dentists
§ 1 (1) All dentists performing periodontics and/or oral surgery of any
kind shall undergo HIV testing at their own expense every six months
beginning January 1995 and shall have an official report sent by the
agency performing the test to a named state representative of the
American Dental Association. This information shall be kept strictly
confidential and shall under no circumstances be released to the public
or the media.
(2) All dentists testing seropositive during an initial screening shall
undergo a confirmation test at the expense of the American Dental
Association and shall have an official report sent by the agency
performing the test to a named state representative of the American
Dental Association. This information shall be kept strictly confidential
and shall under no circumstances be released to the public or the
media.
(3) A person responsible for recording, reporting, or maintaining
information required to be provided under this chapter who recklessly,
knowingly, or intentionally discloses or fails to protect medical
information classified as confidential under this Section commits a
Class. A misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in prison and/or
a fine of up to $5000.
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(4) All dentists testing seropositive after a confirmation test (including
those dentists who discover their seropositive status on their own
instead of through mandatory testing) who wish to continue practicing
without disclosing their seropositive condition to their patients shall be
referred to an expert review panel from their respective states.
(a) Each state shall have at least one expert review panel.
(b) The expert review panels shall be selected and supervised by
the respective state dental associations.
(c) The expert review panel shall:
(i) consist of six dentists per state who have successfully
completed forty hours of intensive training by the Centers
for Disease Control on HIV as it relates to dentistry and on
sterilization procedures;
(ii) work with each seropositive dentist to examine treatment
and sterilization procedures performed in that dental office
to evaluate the potential risk of transmitting the virus to
patients and assistants;
(iii) make an official recommendation to each dentist
reviewed as to which treatment procedures, if any, may
continue to be safely performed and as to changes that must
be made in the office's sterilization procedures. Dentists are
bound by the recommendations of the acting expert review
panel unless they choose to disclose their conditions to their
patients. Dentists who are not satisfied with the recommendations may appeal to the disease control committee of the
respective state dental association for review within sixty
days of the report;
(iv) initiate disciplinary proceedings against those dentists
who fail to comply with the official recommendations of the
panel within sixty days of the presentation of the report and
who fail to appeal through the proper procedure. Disciplinary action may include, but is not limited to, monetary fines,
probation, license suspension or revocation;
(v) keep all actions, contact, investigations, findings,
recommendations and disciplinary proceedings strictly
confidential. A person responsible for recording, reporting,
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or maintaining information required to be provided under
this Chapter who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally
discloses or fails to protect medical information classified as
confidential under this Section commits a Class A
misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in prison and/or
a fine of up to $5000.
(5) All seropositive dentists who choose to terminate their practices
shall qualify for disability insurance with their professional insurance
carriers.
AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION POLICIES
CONCERNING HIV EDUCATION

Resolved, that each dentist licensed to practice in the United States shall
complete twenty hours of certified continuing education per annum focussing on
these areas: facts about HIV and transmission as they relate to dentistry, HIVrelated oral lesions, medications for HIV patients, the most effective and costefficient sterilization techniques available, professional responsibility in the HV
crisis, and education for patients on HIV and sterilization procedures for the
dental office.
Resolved, that the American Dental Association shall encourage and assist all
dentists in educating each and every patient before treatment begins, to build
trust among patients and dentists and to minimize unjustified fears about HIV.
The American Dental Association shall encourage and assist dentists in
developing educational packets, brochures and videos for their patients
concerning HIV, other communicable diseases, and sterilization practices in the
dental office.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The HIV crisis demands that both public health and individual liberties be
zealously guarded. In doing so, HIV raises perplexing questions for legislators
and public health officials who must attempt to stop the spread of a deadly
disease without unduly restricting the civil liberties of citizens infected by it.
Nowhere is achieving the proper balance between individual and collective rights
more difficult. In short, protecting the human rights and dignity of HIV carriers
is a necessity, not a choice. The issue is not the "rights of many" versus the
"rights of few"; the protection of the uninfected majority depends upon and is
inextricably bound with the protection of the rights and dignities of the infected
minority.
Kimberly Bergalis was right when she blamed more than just her dentist for
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her infection. The legislature, the dental professionals, as well as the patients,
are charged with the burden of working together to minimize the risk of
transmission of this deadly disease in dental offices. All of us are responsible
for preventing another Kimberly Bergalis tragedy.
Marjorie H. Lawyer
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